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53 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 427 (2000)

Anything Goes:
Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children from
Controversial Speech
Catherine J. Ross*
In olden days, a glimpse of stocking
Was looked on as something shocking.
But now, God knows,
Anything goes.
-- Cole Porter, Anything Goes (1934)
I. INTRODUCTION
Protecting children from contamination by speech has become the focus of national attention.
The content of the protected speech that the state seeks to regulate is as varied as the form of communications targeted, including the allegedly indecent, sacrilegious, and violent in media ranging
from books to the Internet. Echoing similar crusades to protect children from virtually every new
form of entertainment over the last century, contemporary regulatory efforts to protect children reflect the unique legal status of children and the fragility of constitutional liberties where their vulnerabilities are invoked. But content-based restrictions on speech--even in the name of protecting
young people--presumptively violate the First Amendment,1 which mandates “above all else . . .
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter or its content.”2
Strict scrutiny under the Speech Clause requires the government to demonstrate a compelling interest in regulating speech based on its content and to show that a real harm exists which the restriction on speech will redress. Confronted with the incantation that the state aims to safeguard children, courts at every level, including the Supreme Court, have regularly failed to scrutinize the interest alleged by the government. This lack of analysis is all the more striking because the speech at
issue in this Article is protected under the Constitution. It is neither legally obscene nor used in the
service of criminal acts against children. Both of these categories of speech are unprotected, and are
subject to criminal prosecution under pertinent statutes.
Although many parents and other adults might wish it were otherwise, the Supreme Court has
recognized that as long as controversial speech is available, some “enterprising youngsters” will
find it.3 The Supreme Court has conceded that no “fail-safe” methods can block the most determined teen, especially since government regulations based on content must be narrowly tailored.4
The Supreme Court has long held as inviolable the principle that even the desire to protect youth
will not allow the state to “reduce the adult population . . . to reading only what is fit for children.”5
Regardless of the strength of the government’s interest in protecting children, the Court has insisted
that “the level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be
suitable for a sandbox.”6

One case stemming from efforts to shield children from controversial speech was recently argued before the Supreme Court and a second is likely to reach the Court during the next term: Playboy Entertainment Group v. United States (“Playboy II”), involving control of transmissions from
subscription adult cable channels so that they do not inadvertently reach non-subscribers,7 and
ACLU v. Reno (“ACLU II”), involving the Child Online Protection Act (“COPA”),8 which limits
commercial computer communications deemed “harmful to minors.”9 Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has ruled on three other cases involving the constitutionality of federal efforts to regulate speech in order to shelter children from content: Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC,10 Denver
Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,11 and Reno v. ACLU (“ACLU
I”).12 In each instance, the Court rejected the state’s argument that the goal of shielding children justified significant intrusions on constitutionally protected speech; in each instance, the Supreme
Court overturned all or part of the statute at issue. The holding in each of the cases in the trilogy reiterated the Supreme Court’s express statement in Interstate Circuit v. City of Dallas that the “salutary purpose of protecting children” does not insulate government action from constitutional scrutiny.13 But remarkably, in each of these three cases, the Supreme Court ignored its own dictates by
failing to analyze the state’s asserted compelling interest. Instead, the Court readily accepted the
asserted interest in passing, but found that Congress had exceeded the boundaries of the Speech
Clause in promulgating the specific regulation.14 Legal questions about the regulation of speech to
shield children are likely to recur with increasing frequency, judging from the docket of pending
legislation and statutes not yet tested in the courts.15
As a threshold matter, courts assessing a challenge to a government regulation under the Speech
Clause are required to ask whether the interest asserted by the government is strong enough to move
forward with the applicable test under the First Amendment (normally “strict scrutiny” in the case
of content restrictions) as opposed to the mere “legitimacy” or “rational basis” required in most legislative review.16 Since the restrictions on speech discussed here are indisputably content-based, the
government would need to demonstrate a compelling interest to support the regulations. Then, and
only then, are courts permitted to analyze whether the regulation at issue is indeed “narrowly tailored” to achieve the government’s compelling aims without unduly imposing on protected
speech.17
In case after case, courts at all levels have taken, at most, a cursory glance at the government’s
asserted interest before accepting the government’s position that the interest is “compelling” or
“significant.”18 Legal scholars have also largely failed to analyze the “compelling interests” asserted
by the government.19 In a half dozen cases, however, lower courts have scrutinized, and some have
rejected outright, the government’s proffered rationale for regulations that impinge on First
Amendment freedoms, holding that the government interest asserted was insufficient as presented.20
Serious consequences flow from this lack of attention to the nature of the interest served by
regulating speech in the name of children. First, it leads to the tacit assumption that the government’s proclaimed interests are virtually immune from scrutiny once the state invokes the protection
of children. Second, it suggests that the boundaries of the speech from which children must be protected are virtually limitless. As a result of an apparent lack of boundaries, government at every
level has relied on mere generalized assertions in promulgating broad regulations impinging on protected speech.21 Third, when courts beg the question of the nature of the state’s interest in regulating
speech to shield the young, they inhibit the development of First Amendment jurisprudence and
lead emerging doctrine astray. Because courts have not asked the threshold questions required under
First Amendment doctrine, they have opened the door to using children as an excuse for the state to

intrude upon protected speech, suggesting that regulations on speech will survive scrutiny if they
are narrowly crafted. The cumulative effect of this analytic sloppiness is that courts have glossed
over the foundation question of whether a compelling state interest in regulating protected speech to
shield the young exists at all.
In this Article, I seek to reframe the discussion by calling on courts to force government actors
to meet their constitutional obligation to articulate clear, compelling interests to justify each regulation of speech imposed under the guise of protecting children. It is imperative that courts examine
the nature of the government’s alleged compelling interest in protecting children when considering
regulations on speech because if the government’s interest is insufficient to satisfy the applicable
constitutional standard, an abridgement of protected speech cannot survive scrutiny, no matter how
narrowly it is crafted.22
My discussion focuses on the two compelling interests that the government generally offers for
regulating speech that might reach children. First, proponents of government regulation of speech
point to a compelling interest in helping parents to control their children’s exposure to certain kinds
of communication. Second, the state claims an independent interest in the development of children,
regardless of the decisions made by their parents.23
Unfortunately, the entire subject of these compelling interests has been isolated from the growing literature on the relationship between the state and families.24 The first proposed interest-reinforcing parental authority--relies on a simplistic view that presumes a harmony between the interests of individual parents and the interests of the state. If the United States were a theocracy, such
an assumption might be warranted: parents who did not share the nation’s views could be forced to
do so. But it is a foundational principle of governance in the United States that an on-going tension
exists and must be tolerated between the constitutional guarantees of individual autonomy and the
desire for a collective vision of the social good.
Applied to the relationship between the variety of families and the state, this tension translates
into perpetual stresses along three sides of a triangle with endpoints labeled PCS: Parent, Child, and
State. In some instances, the rights and preferences of parent and child will align perfectly, and will
conflict with those of the state. This configuration is the principle focus of this discussion. In other
instances, the state may intervene on behalf of the child in opposition to the parents, as in child
abuse cases. In yet another configuration, a child may seek to exercise rights outside the home in
opposition to parental wishes, and turn to the state for support, as when a teenager seeks to obtain
an abortion without parental consent. This Article focuses on situations in which parents either wish
the child to have access to communications that the state regards as inappropriate or take a more
restrictive view than the state of what speech is appropriate for their child.
Proponents of regulation often claim a second compelling interest--an independent interest-rooted in the government’s generalized commitment to nurture and educate the next generation of
citizens. Upon examination, this second interest turns out to be no less problematic than the first.
Constitutionally recognized principles of autonomy and family privacy limit the State’s authority to
make moral or developmental choices for minors in areas traditionally reserved for their parents or
guardians.25 To justify intrusions on parental rights and family privacy, proponents of abridging
speech would need to demonstrate specific harm flowing from the speech.
Part II of this Article provides a brief historical perspective on long-standing concerns about the
pernicious effect of new forms of communication on children. Part III defines the universe of pro-

tected, non-obscene but controversial speech that is at issue. Part IV sets out the test which courts
are required to use in assessing the existence and strength of the compelling interest the state asserts
for regulating speech and reveals the failure of the Supreme Court to apply its own standards for
analyzing the government interest when the government invokes the need to protect children from
speech. Part V examines the State’s asserted compelling interest in empowering parents to enforce
their speech choices on minors, including consideration of the varieties of families, family autonomy rights, the strength of competing private interests of certain parents and minors, and the potential conflicts between parental choices and governmental assumptions about social norms. Part VI
analyzes the government’s proclaimed compelling interest in regulating material available to minors
based on the State’s independent interest in the well being of its future citizens. Part VII analyzes
the six evenly divided lower court opinions that have scrutinized the compelling interest put forward by proponents of regulations on speech to shield children, as well as the cases which the Supreme Court is expected to decide in the near future. Finally, the conclusion sets forth how scrutinizing the government’s compelling interest will restore analytical rigor to an area of law too often
susceptible to untested intuition supporting the imposition of majoritarian norms at the cost of constitutional liberties.
II. THE TRADITION OF PROTECTING INNOCENT CHILDREN FROM NEW FORMS OF
EXPRESSION26
The public is concerned about what children are hearing and seeing, and to some extent for good
reason. Popular concern about the volume of exposure to various forms of media and about its content has spilled over into political discourse.27 Even before the shootings at Columbine High,28
Senator Robert Byrd proclaimed on the Senate floor:
The political and social environment in which parents must today raise their children is,
unfortunately, an environment in which anything goes . . . . Profanity, vulgarity, sex
and violence are pervasive in television programming, in the movies, and in much of
today’s books that pretend to pass for literature. The nation is inexorably sinking toward the lowest common denominator in its standards and values. Haven’t we had
enough?29
In response to such anxieties, both federal and state governments have sought to reduce the exposure of children to arguably unsuitable material.
Regulations aim at communications that emanate from peers,30 as well as those that appear in
books,31 newspapers and magazines,32 radio broadcasts,33 rock music,34 movies,35 broadcast and cable television,36 card games,37 video games,38 telecommunications,39 and computer materials-including the Internet.40 The regulations generally fall into four dominant modes: (i) an outright ban
on the speech;41 (ii) channeling the speech so that it may only be available at times when children
are assumed to be least likely to have access to it;42 (iii) using identification requirements to ensure
that only adults receive the speech;43 and (iv) filtering mechanisms reliant on technology designed
to help parents and other adults screen speech according to pre-assigned categories and labels attached by others.44
Many parents and grandparents, including legislators and judges in their individual capacities,
“would like to see the efforts of Congress to protect children from harmful materials . . . ultimately
succeed and the will of the majority of citizens in this country to be realized.”45 But they will never

succeed in completely shielding the young from exposure to controversial topics because there is
virtually no information that an enterprising youngster could not pick up from news coverage. The
highest elected official admits marital infidelity involving fellatio;46 high school students use guns
to murder their teachers and/or classmates;47 a prominent musician, accused of child molestation,
reportedly pays millions of dollars to avoid legal penalties;48 international news includes coverage
of so-called “ethnic cleansing” in the Balkans49 and ethnic slaughter in Africa.50 None of these news
stories could be barred consistent with the First Amendment.51
The prevalence of such speech in news coverage underscores the flaws in the dominant mode of
analyzing speech rights in light of the medium in which the speech occurs. The fragmented analysis
grows in large part from the Supreme Court’s doctrine that different levels of scrutiny apply to different forms of media52 --with the highest deference traditionally paid to verbal expression and print
media and the lowest to broadcast media.53 I agree with the many scholars and jurists who question
the continued vitality of the Supreme Court’s distinction among forms of expression, which reached
its apex in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.54 Except where it would be unrealistic to do so, the analysis
here emphasizes the similarities rather than the distinctions among forms of communication.55 For
purposes of protecting children, the source of the speech makes little difference, except for the distinction between forms of speech that require literacy and those that do not.
The argument that the government has an independent interest in regulating protected speech on
behalf of children rests on the relatively recent social construction of the child as innocent. It is also
class based. Few observers who sought to protect children from contaminated speech in the nineteenth century argued that innocence characterized child laborers in mines and factories, chimney
sweeps, gutter snipes, or residents of the poorhouses depicted by Charles Dickens. The expansion of
the notion of child as innocent made such conditions intolerable to social reformers.56
Regulatory efforts to shield children from controversial speech to preserve their innocence have
a long lineage. Legal precedent dates back to at least 1868, in the British case of The Queen v. Hicklinwhich, although unconstrained by the First Amendment, proved influential in the United States.57
Hicklin enunciated an “obscenity” test designed to protect the lowest common denominator among
minors and the most vulnerable adults.58 According to Hicklin, the work could be banned entirely if
it would tend to “deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and
into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall . . . [and if] it would suggest to the minds of the
young of either sex . . . thoughts of a most impure and libidinous character.”59 American courts
adopted the Hicklin standard, which provided a roadmap for nearly a century of jurisprudence on
obscene and what would now be deemed controversial speech.60
Moral crusaders persistently justified regulation of every new form of entertainment as necessary to protect the young. Building on social anxieties that associate young people with disorder,
violence, and uncontrolled libido, they have targeted new forms of speech as a cause of youthful
immorality, even as they lamented the inability of parents to live up to the trust society has placed in
them as the primary custodians of their children. The gatekeepers of Anglo-American culture have
long enlisted the state’s help in limiting the controversial speech available to the young. In England,
G.K. Chesterton commented on the absurdity of the influence on young reprobates attributed to evil
reading: “It is firmly fixed in the minds of most people that gutter-boys, unlike everybody else in
the community, find their principle motives for conduct in printed books.”61
In the United States, Anthony Comstock personified the movement for state regulation of reading matter and entertainment on the grounds that it was necessary to protect children.62 Satan cre-

ated titillating traps, he proclaimed, “for boys and girls especially.”63 Comstock demanded that the
state protect children from a seemingly endless variety of new cultural dangers, including: dime
novels and serialized tales; story papers;64 books, theatrical performances and pictures (including
the classics) that might “arouse in young and inexperienced minds lewd and libidinous thoughts;”65
illustrated newspapers depicting crimes;66 information about contraception;67 stage plays of “beastly
character;”68 chewing gum containing prizes;69 and candy lotteries available in confectionery
stores.70 Comstock did not trust parents to be aware of the pernicious effects of such entertainment,
or even to realize its proximity to their children.
Motion pictures especially raised a tumult of efforts at censorship from their inception.71 Some
major cities even shut down all movie theaters, prompted at least in part by the notion that movies
were “schools of crime.”72 The Supreme Court initially declined to extend the protection of the First
Amendment to moving pictures.73 In its 1915 decision in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, a unanimous Supreme Court rejected an industry claim that movies were “useful, interesting,
amusing, educational and moral.”74 The Court condemned movies as “capable of evil . . . the greater
because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition.”75 Following that ruling, nearly one hundred bills intended to censor motion pictures were introduced in the various state legislatures in
1921 alone. In the next year similar bills came before Congress, until the industry agreed to police
itself.76
The Supreme Court did not reverse Mutual Film until 1952.77 In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
the Supreme Court held for the first time that “expression by means of motion pictures is included
within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”78 The majority opinion flatly rejected the state’s justification of censorship on the grounds that “motion pictures possess a greater capacity for evil, particularly among the youth of a community, than other
modes of expression.”79
In Burstyn, the Supreme Court enunciated the frequently cited principle that “each method [of
speech] tends to present its own peculiar problems.”80 In subsequent references to the “peculiar”
properties of each medium, the Supreme Court has inexplicably neglected the rest of that passage,81
which underscores that the principles of the Speech Clause transcend any distinctions based on
mode of expression: “the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First
Amendment’s command, do not vary. Those principles . . . make freedom of expression the rule.”82
But that did not stop public outcries about the emergence of new modes of speech.83 In 1954-55,
the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary concluded that the “crime and horror” genre of
comic books which “offer short courses in murder, mayhem, robbery, rape, cannibalism, carnage,
necrophilia, sex, sadism, masochism, and virtually every other form of crime” read daily by thousands of children was “contributing to the country’s alarming rise in juvenile delinquency.”84 At
about the same time, courts noted that “the broadening of freedom of expression and of the frankness with which sex and sex relations are dealt with . . . appear in all media of public expression.”85
The controversies continued in response to the evolution of television, computers, video games,
and music.86 Cole Porter’s “Love for Sale” may have pushed the envelope in 1930. In the mid1960s “Let’s Spend the Night Together” seemed pretty risque.87 More recently, Grammy Award
winner Alanis Morrisette lamented the loss of her lover to another woman, asking “will she go
down on you in a theater?”88 and Nine Inch Nails offered the romantic medley “you let me violate

you, you let me desecrate you, you let me penetrate you . . . I want to fuck you like an animal . . .
.”89
The pace of social change and the emergence of new modes and styles of communication have
long inspired calls for censorship designed to shield children from contamination, and they continue
to prompt parental concern. But whether or not such adult concerns are justified, or look reasonable
in hindsight, the Speech Clause restricts the ability of the body politic to regulate speech that is protected for adults. Government efforts to make protected speech unavailable to children must overcome a number of constitutional barriers, beginning with the problem of definition, as explored in
the following Part.
III. DEFINITIONS AND PARAMETERS
In this Article, I refer to “offensive and disagreeable” speech that is nonetheless protected under
the Speech Clause as “controversial.”90 Controversial speech comprises the combined category of
“indecent” speech which does not meet the legal definition of obscenity yet may be offensive to
some recipients, and speech that contains “violent” material, which are the two kinds of content that
seem most likely to alarm popular sentiment when they reach children.91 Material that may offend
in other ways, such as speech that might be perceived as blasphemous or racist also falls within the
rubric of “controversial” speech. Admittedly, the term “controversial” is as vague as the terms “indecent,” “patently offensive,” or “violent.” Different observers, in different communities, perhaps
depending on context, will draw the line at different subjects and at different ways of presenting
those subjects.92 The lines between unprotected speech and controversial speech are often murky,
especially since the definition of obscenity93 (which is not protected speech) is far from a model of
legal precision. As difficult as it has been for courts to define obscenity, protected controversial
speech is even more amorphous. This Part examines the parameters of controversial speech by clarifying the sources of concern, the underlying difficulty of establishing meaningful categories of
speech, and the range of controversial speech that has been targeted for regulation.94
Judge Patricia Wald of the District of Columbia Circuit, commenting on the cable indecency
statute ultimately overturned by the Supreme Court in Denver Area,95 captured the confusion surrounding the legal status of controversial speech:
Lurid descriptions of programming that may well cross over the line into obscenity and
merit no First Amendment protection at all should not obscure what this case really is
about. This case is not about obscenity; it concerns significant restrictions on a class of
speech that is unquestionably entitled to constitutional protection, although possibly offensive to some audiences. Under the broad definition of ‘indecency’ used in this regulation, affected speech could include programs on the AIDS epidemic, abortion, childbirth, or practically any aspect of human sexuality, as well as much literature and art
from all over the world.96
No communications are beyond challenge, even the Bible. The Song of Solomon is obscene to
some people.97 The Bible is replete with stories of adultery, family betrayal, and actions motivated
by physical passion.98 Some who do not find the Bible obscene may find the stories it contains controversial.
A. Government Regulation of Constitutionally Unprotected Speech

By definition, the protected speech that is my concern here is not legally obscene and is not used
to facilitate crimes against children. Both obscenity99 and criminal speech100 are outside the protection of the First Amendment, and are illegal under a variety of statutes. None of the arguments offered here challenge the Supreme Court’s holding in New York v. Ferber that “prevention of sexual
exploitation and abuse” of minors is “a government objective of surpassing importance.”101 In contrast to the speech under consideration here, Ferber upheld a law intended to stop the use and exploitation of actual children in the production of child pornography.102
Obscenity (or what is generally called hard-core pornography) lies outside the protection of the
First Amendment regardless of the medium of communication.103 Obscene speech can be, and is,
regulated for adults and children alike.104 Under the test enunciated in Miller v. California, three
elements must coalesce to render a communication legally obscene:
(a) . . . ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) . . . the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) . . . the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value.105
As discussed further below, controversial speech often has “serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value” which prevents the speech from falling within the legal definition of obscenity.106
The three elements of the Miller test may be modified when applied to minors, so that the impact of the speech and its value may differ depending on whether or not the recipient is an adult. In
Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court upheld a variable definition of obscenity for minors contained in a state statute barring the sale to minors of non-obscene “girlie” magazines that were protected speech for consenting adults.107 It is frequently assumed that Ginsberg provides a rationale
for regulating protected speech, but in fact Ginsberg only lowered the bar for obscenity as applied
to minors.108 The statute at issue adapted the then-governing test for obscenity (the Roth-Memoirs
test)109 to weigh community standards as to “what is suitable material for minors.”110 The act further
“adjusted the definition of obscenity ‘to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests’ of such minors.”111
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Ginsberg was premised on the assumption that the material
which the statute suppressed for those under the age of seventeen was in fact “obscene” as to minors
(though not as to adults, under the concept of “variable obscenity”), and therefore that the speech
was outside the protection of the First Amendment.112 This is a critical distinction from the protected controversial matter with which this Article is concerned, for it determined the level of scrutiny the Court applied to the “girlie” magazine statute at issue in Ginsberg. The majority opinion
made explicit that since the magazines were unprotected as to minors under the Speech Clause, the
only question for the Court was “whether the New York Legislature might rationally conclude . . .
that exposure to the materials proscribed . . . constitutes such an ‘abuse.’“113 Once the Court accepted the legislature’s finding that the material was obscene for minors, it logically followed that
the law would receive only the rational basis scrutiny that applies to statutes which do not implicate
constitutional liberties. Applying that deferential standard, the Court concluded “it is not irrational
for the legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by the statute is harmful to minors.”114

Many of the doctrinal problems surrounding controversial speech and children stem from the
failure to confront the significance of the fact that Ginsberg does not stand for the principle that the
state has a “compelling interest” in regulating protected speech that reaches minors. Nor does any
language in the majority opinion suggest that the Supreme Court would have found a higher standard than mere rationality to have been satisfied on the facts. Justice Brennan pointed out that there
was no dearth of studies contradicting the legislative finding that reading such magazines was injurious to the development of young people.115 But, he observed, in applying rational basis analysis,
“we do not demand of legislatures ‘scientifically certain criteria.’“116 To the contrary, in order to
support a regulation of speech that does not infringe on constitutional rights, such as the speech at
issue in Ginsberg, the state must only provide “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis” for its action.117
If “scientifically certain criteria” remain unnecessary when the government attempts to demonstrate a compelling interest as opposed to a rational basis for legislation, at least some level of certitude may be required before courts are asked to approve infringement of core liberty interests. The
government’s burden to demonstrate a “compelling interest” requires something more than a mere
showing that the government regulation is not irrational.118 If material does not fall within the definition of variable obscenity applicable to minors, then the state may not prevent minors from receiving the speech. Speech that is not obscene for minors is protected from state regulation for minors
as well as for adults.119
B. Controversial Speech and the Problem of Meaningful Definitions
While the Supreme Court has never succeeded in defining obscenity with clarity, it has never
even attempted to define indecent or violent speech.120 The speech subjected to regulation in order
to protect children is often characterized as arguably “indecent,” a term which has no legal definition.121 A Congressional attempt to expand the margins of indecency--however defined--lay at the
heart of ACLU I, in which the Supreme Court held that two statutory provisions enacted “to protect
minors from ‘indecent’ and ‘patently offensive’ communications on the Internet” violated the First
Amendment.122 The portions of the statute at issue in ACLU I, the Communications Decency Act
(“CDA”), effectively barred both indecent and patently offensive speech from the Internet, but did
not define either term.123 Significantly, the CDA did not provide any exceptions for content with
“serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value” even in an educational context,124 including
serious communications between parents and their own children. The CDA imposed criminal penalties both on speakers who knew that their communications would reach minors and on those who
merely displayed messages on the Internet in a manner that would be accessible to minors. The latter behavior included all materials posted on unrestricted web pages or contributions to chat rooms
that a minor might enter in the midst of a dialogue. Because of the lack of a scienter requirement,
the breadth of the speech affected and the lack of a defense based on the inherent value of the
speech, the CDA effectively squelched virtually all speech about sex and bodily functions on the
Internet. It barred adult speakers and recipients as well as minors from engaging in such speech.
Whatever the precise definitions, however elusive they may be, Justice Scalia has correctly
noted the irony that as society becomes more tolerant of a variety of speech--removing it from the
category of “obscenity” which may be subject to regulation--the result is that a higher proportion of
speech that offends many citizens falls into the even amorphous category of “indecent.”125 The contraction of the scope of unprotected speech related to sex and the resulting expansion of the universe
of protected “indecent” speech makes the intractable problem of definitions both more difficult and

more important. “Where a reasonable person draws the line in this balancing process--that is, how
few children render the risk unacceptable--depends in part on what mere ‘indecency’ (as opposed to
‘obscenity’) includes,” Justice Scalia observed, focusing on speech that falls at the margins.126 “The
more narrow the understanding of what is ‘obscene’ and hence the more pornographic what is embraced within the residual category of ‘indecency,’ the more reasonable it becomes to insist upon
greater assurance of insulation from minors,” he concluded.127 To justify restrictions on speech,
however, the government--unlike parents--must have an interest that is more than “reasonable.”128
The Supreme Court has never squarely confronted the question of whether speech that is “indecent” (however defined) is entitled to lesser constitutional protection than other forms of protected
speech.129 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, however, that indecent speech falls
within the rubric of protected speech, and that the government may not make such speech inaccessible to adults.130 According to Justice Stevens’ plurality opinion in Pacifica:
The concept of ‘indecent’ is intimately connected with children to language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards
for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs at times of day
when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.131
Pacifica represents the epitome of the FCC’s gradual expansion of the concept of indecency since
the 1920s from “an amorphous generalization poorly differentiated from obscenity into a concept
‘intimately connected with the exposure of children to’“ controversial material.132
The treatment of violent speech is distinguishable from the speech considered in Pacifica which
involved sexuality and bodily functions. Although there is widespread concern about the amount of
violence contained in entertainment that reaches children,133 the Supreme Court has never held that
speech containing violent sentiments or imagery lies outside the protection of the First Amendment
as applied to either adults or children.134 The sole exceptions are speech that fits the definition of
“fighting words” or rises to the level of “incitement,” neither of which applies for the purposes of
the analysis here.135 Controversial speech about violence merely portrays violent acts or characters
but does not expressly advocate imminent violence. It is no easier to define than speech dealing
with sexuality. As early as 1972, the FCC concluded that it could not prohibit broadcast violence
because the subject matter would prove impossible to define.136 And violence has not become any
easier to define with the passage of time. As one Congressman recently wondered, does violence
mean “a movie like ‘Home Alone,’ . . . a movie like ‘Ben Hur,’ . . . [or] a movie like ‘[Saving] Private Ryan’?”137
As difficult as it has been to develop a legal definition of obscenity, and as elusive as the effort
to pin down violent speech has proven, protected controversial speech is even more resistant to precise definition.138 Controversial speech falls along a spectrum, so that some speech may fall just on
the legal side of obscenity, saved by some small measure of “literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value,” while other controversial speech is clearly far from obscene but offensive to some sensibilities. Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, after all, defied their families, engaged in ardent teenage sex,
and committed suicide.
The third prong of the Miller test (the “value” prong) saves a substantial portion of speech from
being labeled obscene even as to minors. The CDA would have impermissibly barred Internet
communications about birth control practices, safe sex, the consequences of prison rape, each of the

seven dirty words at issue in Pacifica, classic artworks depicting nudes, and arguably the card catalogues of major libraries, each of which has value under Miller.139
The subjectivity which Justices as different as Justice Scalia and Justice Brennan have correctly
attributed to the Miller test has become a matter of legal concern because of the “lack of an ascertainable standard” with which to measure value.140 As one Congressman put it, “where one Member’s aversions end, others with different sensibilities and with different values begin.”141 Justice
Scalia, who concurred in a case holding that the third prong of Miller contemplates requiring jurors
to assess the saving value of speech according to a reasonable person standard,142 protested that asking jurors to make such a judgment as “reasonable” people was “quite impossible . . . there being
many accomplished people who have found literature in Dada, and art in the replication of a soup
can.”143 Such decisionmaking, if not always impossible, he continued, “is at least impossible in the
cases that matter.”144
Justice Scalia concluded that “we would be better advised to adopt as a legal maxim what has
long been the wisdom of mankind: De gustibus non est disputandum. Just as there is no use arguing
about taste, there is no use litigating about it.”145 In what may seem to be a tautology, but is a building block of First Amendment jurisprudence, if the speech is not obscene (and does not fall within
limited other First Amendment exceptions), it is protected under the Speech Clause.146
IV. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT’S INTEREST
The failure to achieve specificity in articulating the kinds of speech the state seeks to regulate
has complicated judicial efforts to scrutinize the government’s alleged interests. And yet, that is
precisely what the applicable legal standard requires the courts to do.
A. The Applicable Legal Standard
The Supreme Court has expressly required judges to ask whether the record supports a finding
that the governmental interest asserted reaches the constitutional dimension required by the applicable First Amendment test. Except in the rarest circumstances, the test applied to regulations on controversial speech will be strict scrutiny because the regulations are content-based.147 Strict scrutiny
requires courts to balance the individual liberty interests affected against the government’s proclaimed interest.148
The Speech Clause occupies a special place in constitutional jurisprudence because it lies at the
core of three foundational principles of our system of governance: the marketplace of ideas, selfdetermination, and personal autonomy.149 The marketplace of ideas primarily captures the notion
that “good” speech will overcome “bad,” so that “truth” will prevail. The marketplace is a prerequisite for creating an informed populace capable of governing itself through democratic selfdetermination.150 Both of these interrelated utilitarian values are closely linked to the third goal of
personal autonomy. As Justice Brandeis explained, the Founding Fathers believed that “the final
end of the state was to make men free to develop their facilities, and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a
means.”151 All three values are at stake when the state abridges speech even for the popular goal of
shielding children.152
Constitutional jurisprudence imposes a heavy burden on the state when regulating expression.153
According to First Amendment doctrine, courts may not even evaluate whether a given regulation is
narrowly tailored until the state establishes its compelling interest. The state must both articulate

and demonstrate a compelling interest based on a real harm in order to justify any government regulation on the content of speech. The government must also show two corollaries to shore up its
claim that the interest is compelling, rather than merely legitimate. First, the government must demonstrate a nexus between the harm the government seeks to diminish and the particular speech affected by the regulation. Second, the state must demonstrate a likelihood that the regulation will
substantially diminish the harm.
The Supreme Court has long held that government may not regulate otherwise protected speech
based on its content without demonstrating a specific nexus between the speech and harm flowing
to citizens. For example, a state may have a “legitimate interest” in preserving the integrity of the
electoral process, but that interest is not sufficiently “compelling” to sustain statutory limitations on
the nature of the promises a candidate may make to the electorate during a campaign.154 Similarly,
the Supreme Court overturned a statutory limitation on political contributions made by corporations,
on the grounds that the regulation was “unjustified by a compelling state interest.”155
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, the Supreme Court invalidated a regulation designed to protect children, because it lacked the “clarity of purpose” essential under the Speech Clause.156 To justify differential treatment of speech based on content, the State must first show that the regulation
“is necessary to serve a compelling state interest.”157 The burden is on the government to demonstrate that it has a compelling interest in regulating speech; the government interest cannot be taken
for granted.158 As Justice Brandeis warned, “fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression
of free speech . . . . Men feared witches and burnt women . . . . To justify suppression of free speech
there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced.”159
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the case that accorded cable television greater protection than that available to the broadcast media, the Supreme Court clarified its earlier hints about
the judicial duty to inquire into the government’s compelling interest. Despite fractured opinions on
the merits in Turner, and the application of intermediate rather than strict scrutiny, the Justices
unanimously agreed that:
When the government defends a regulation on speech as a means to . . . prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply ‘posit the existence of the disease sought to
be cured’ . . . . It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material
way.160
One year later, in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, a case that did not require strict scrutiny because the regulation was content-neutral, the Supreme Court reiterated the
burden on the government.161 The Supreme Court made explicit that in order to regulate protected
speech at all, the government must demonstrate a compelling interest, including a nexus between
the interest it asserts and the actual harm that the regulation can prevent.162 National Treasury Employees involved a statute banning federal employees from accepting compensation for speeches
and articles, regardless of subject matter. Because the statute did not discriminate among forms of
speech based on content, the Court only subjected it to a rational basis review, but one that can be
understood as a “heightened reasonableness” test.163 Even in this context, the majority imposed the
burden on the state to establish a compelling interest which it had spelled out in Turner.164

Under the Turner test, it is not sufficient for the government to assert an abstract or generalized
interest in children’s development to sustain a regulation on speech. In order to meet its burden to
show a compelling interest in regulating speech to shield the young, the state would have to demonstrate: (i) that children’s social, moral or emotional development is at stake; (ii) that the speech is
the direct cause of the risk; and (iii) that restricting the speech will in fact reduce the risk of harm.
This means that after the government establishes that controversial speech jeopardizes children, it
must also show that the regulation will effectively minimize the risks.
Balancing involves more than a declaration that one set of interests is more important than another. It requires the court to identify the interests on both sides, value them, and compare them.165
In order for a court to assess value, the government may need to provide empirical data about such
issues as the extent and seriousness of the problem which the government seeks to resolve by impinging on a constitutional right, on the one hand, and whether the regulation is likely to resolve the
problem efficiently enough that the trade-offs are justifiable, on the other.
Despite the clear instructions set forth in Turner, courts at all levels regularly fail to explore
whether the government has demonstrated the components of a compelling interest. The formal judicial inquiry under the Speech Clause normally skips the required threshold inquiry into the compelling interest alleged by the government and focuses instead on just two of the three critical questions that courts must weigh in analyzing abridgements of speech: (i) the nature of the constitutional
liberty interests at stake;166 and (ii) whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve the government interest without undue burden on speech.167
B. The Supreme Court Cases
Although the government regularly cites Pacifica for the proposition that a compelling interest
in shielding children from indecency justifies at least some forms of regulation,168 the facts in
Pacifica would not satisfy the standards subsequently spelled out in Turner.169 In Pacifica, the Supreme Court upheld FCC enforcement proceedings that followed from an afternoon radio broadcast
of satirist George Carlin’s monologue about seven dirty words that must never be said on broadcast
media. Justice Stevens’ opinion for the plurality took the government’s interest for granted in that
context.170 None of the four opinions issued offered any explicit discussion of whether an independent government interest in protecting children exists, much less whether the government had established a convincing nexus between the regulated speech and the anticipated harm.171
Even in the most recent Supreme Court cases involving regulation of speech to protect children,
the government has not seriously attempted to establish that the controversial speech it sought to
regulate is a cause of real harm. Nor has the Supreme Court raised Turner as a hurdle that the government must clear, despite the test it had set forth. This judicial deficit is emphatically present in
the trilogy of cases involving speech deemed harmful to children with which this Article began:
ACLU I, Sable, and Denver Area.
In ACLU I, the Supreme Court entirely failed to analyze the governmental interest in protecting
children from indecency on the Internet. Instead, it summarily noted the “legitimacy and importance
of the congressional goal.”172 Under First Amendment analysis, a merely “legitimate” or “important” interest normally would not withstand even intermediate scrutiny, much less the strict scrutiny
imposed where the government interferes with protected speech based on its content.173
In Sable, despite the Supreme Court’s earlier pronouncements on the importance of scrutinizing
the interests set forth by the government, the majority summarily concluded that the Court has “rec-

ognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being
of minors.”174 To reach this sweeping conclusion, the Supreme Court accepted the government’s
reliance on Ginsberg and Ferber.175 Neither Ginsberg nor Ferber, however, were decided under a
strict scrutiny analysis, and therefore neither establishes a “compelling interest” for purposes of
regulating protected speech in any context.176
In Denver Area, the Justices paid slightly more attention to the government’s asserted interest,
but were inconsistent in labeling the nature of that interest. Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion notes
at the outset that the government has a “basic, legitimate objective of protecting children from exposure to ‘patently offensive’ materials.”177 Subsequently, in a portion of the plurality opinion
joined by only three Justices, Justice Breyer changed the label applied to the government interest
from “legitimate” to “compelling,” in the context of analyzing why a total ban on protected speech
violates the First Amendment, regardless of the strength of the government’s interest.178 In Denver
Area, the Supreme Court held that while Congress could permit a cable operator to decide whether
to allow broadcast of indecent material on leased access channels, it could not require cable operators to segregate and block such programming. Nor could Congress allow cable operators to prevent
rare or nonexistent ‘patently offensive’ programming on public, educational, and government channels (“PEGs”) since it had not proven that a social problem even existed on channels reserved for
use by public and nonprofit organizations.179
The incoherent discussion of the government’s interest in Denver Area was extraordinary because it violated every requirement the Supreme Court itself had imposed under Turner. The Justices jumped from labeling the state interest “basic” or “legitimate” to calling it “compelling” and,
in the next breath, concluded that at least one part of the legislation was not even “necessary.” Not a
single opinion asked how a statute that is not “necessary” could serve a compelling state interest. If
it had applied Turner, the Supreme Court should have concluded that to the extent the government
failed to demonstrate that the harms it alleged were real, it had no compelling interest in regulating
controversial material.180
Where protection of children is invoked as an interest, cogent legal analysis too often is deemed
gratuitous. Many factors contribute to this analytic looseness. These factors include an emotional
response to children’s vulnerability, an irrational sense that if a law is designed to protect children,
then it must be good,and the often unquestioned legal principle that while children may have rights,
the rights accorded to them are not co-extensive with the rights of adults.181 The operative presumption of the latter principle, which is too often inverted, is that children do indeed possess some version of constitutional rights. Those rights include the right to receive speech and the right to speak.
The Supreme Court has never defined the precise parameters of children’s constitutional rights,
whether under the Speech Clause or more broadly,182 but the Supreme Court has sometimes minimized those rights by indicating that the state may regulate the conduct of minors beyond what
would be constitutional if applied to adults.183 It is not necessary to resolve the debate surrounding
the scope of children’s speech rights with regard to limitations imposed by the state in this context,
because constitutional liberties are not operative between children and their parents.184 The central
issue here is whether the state has a compelling interest in limiting speech that some parents may
wish their own children to receive.
Whatever the respective merits and defects of presumptions about rights that flow directly to
minors, the frequent diminution of rights exercised by young citizens should raise warning flags
when used to justify regulations on speech that affect adults as well as children, which was the case

with the statutes at issue in ACLU I, Sable, and Denver Area. It may well be that the statutes under
review in ACLU I and Sable--and, more indirectly, in Denver Area--were so transparently unconstitutional in the scope of their ban on speech that the Justices realized at first glance that the regulations before them would not survive scrutiny. Under such circumstances, not confronted with a
close case, perhaps the Supreme Court deemed it less pressing to analyze the state’s compelling interest. This approach carries grave consequences. First, it promotes undisciplined thinking about the
nature of the government’s interest, which may affect the future actions of legislators and regulators. Second, it suggests to judges sitting on the lower courts that they too can skip the required inquiry into the state’s compelling interest. Finally, the implicit promise of judicial deference invites
legislators and advocates of censorship to abridge speech with relative abandon.
It may seem that assessment of the weightiness of the state’s interest is largely subjective.185
The standard is not, however, entirely subjective because it places a burden on the government to
demonstrate the existence of a specified harm that can be successfully addressed by regulation--a
minimal requirement that the government has frequently failed to meet when it relies on “the salutary purpose of protecting children.”186 A finding that the state’s interest in regulating speech to protect children does not constitute a sufficiently “compelling interest” to justify the regulation of protected speech does “not belittle the state’s interest in the well-being of minors.”187 The interest
might still be sufficient to satisfy a rational basis test, as in Ginsberg.188 It would also justify numerous government programs designed to help children and families that do not impinge on speech
rights or other foundational constitutional liberties.
C. The Specter of Censorship
The incoherence of the judiciary invites efforts to constrain freedom of expression. As Justice
Kennedy has argued, raw censorship based on content renders any government regulation of speech
unconstitutional unless it reaches only the narrowly defined types of speech that fall outside the protection of the First Amendment.189 He fears that the Court’s willingness even to examine the proposed compelling interest behind a regulation “might be read as a concession that States may censor
speech whenever they believe there is a compelling justification for doing so.”190 To be sure, the
passivity of most courts--including the Supreme Court--in accepting the interest the government
alleges in protecting children suggests that this concern may be well-founded.
If Justice Kennedy’s view prevailed, it would be unnecessary to explore the depth, precision or
legitimacy of the state’s alleged compelling interests in regulating speech to protect children. But as
long as strict scrutiny, beginning with analysis of the compelling interest asserted, remains the mode
of analyzing infringements on protected speech, courts should perform the serious inquiry urged
here where the government claims to be motivated by a desire to protect children.
1. Looking at Motives
Strict scrutiny does not permit courts to wear blinders regarding the intent of those who would
curtail speech.191 In the major cases involving restrictions on controversial speech to protect children, intent to chill the speech more generally has not been a close question, as courts have noted
repeatedly. The Supreme Court has been unequivocal in stating that to withstand scrutiny, the compelling interest alleged by the government must be the “actual purpose,” not just one that seems
convincing.192
In ACLU I, the majority of the Justices expressly labeled the CDA a transparent attempt at “censorship,”193 and with good cause. Senator James Exon, one of the drafters of the CDA, presented the

Senate with a compendium of lurid materials available on the Internet that, in his view, threatened
to turn every computer into a “red light district.”194 He lamented the littering of “this information
superhighway with obscene [and] indecent . . . pornography . . . . Virtual but virtueless reality is
projected in the most twisted, sick use of sexuality.”195
So too, Senator Joseph Lieberman, praising a separate title in the statute that contained the CDA
which required that television manufacturers install a “V-chip” allowing parents to block receipt of
certain categories of programs, proclaimed that the problem is not “rating the garbage” but how to
“get rid of the garbage.”196 Supporters of the statute overturned in Denver Area stated on the floor
of Congress that controversial cable programming “should be stopped, must be stopped.”197 The
purpose of the legislation, they continued, was “to put an end to the kind of things going on” on cable channels.198
While neither a considered nor a cavalier attitude toward enactment by the legislators is dispositive,199 federal courts have noted with dismay the cavalier process commonly accorded government
regulations on speech once the goal of protecting children is invoked. The frequent lack of serious
consideration to restrictions on speech adopted in the name of protecting children flies in the face of
the Supreme Court’s proclamation that the “essence” of the Speech Clause is “that Congress may
not regulate speech except in cases of extraordinary need and with the exercise of a degree of care
that we have not elsewhere required.”200
In ACLU I, for example, the Supreme Court detailed the lack of legislative attention paid to the
CDA’s key provisions by legislators. In contrast to the other six Titles of the statute in which the
CDA was embedded, each of which, Justice Stevens noted, was “the product of extensive committee hearings and the subject of discussion in Reports prepared by the Committees of the Senate and
the House of Representatives,” in enacting the CDA, he underscored, “the Senate went in willynilly, passed legislation, and never once had a hearing, never once had a discussion other than an
hour or so on the floor.”201 Further, Justice Stevens drew an express and disapproving parallel between the legislative process that resulted in the CDA and the haphazard process that resulted in the
statute regarding telephone indecency at issue in Sable.202 Sable was perhaps even more troubling,
because the legislation at issue in the case emerged following a decade in which Congress and the
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) attempted end-runs around decisions by the lower
courts invalidating their efforts to eliminate commercial telephone sex.203
The government has repeatedly failed to exercise even a modest degree of care in enacting
measures that limit protected speech with the asserted purpose of protecting children, much less to
demonstrate the special sensitivity required under the Speech Clause. The record indicates that legislators have used children as a transparent excuse for broad censorship on more than one occasion.
The lapses in sensitivity to speech rights when children are involved, noted by the Supreme Court,
make it even more imperative to analyze the interests asserted by the government as Turner requires. To sustain its purported interest, the state must demonstrate that a compelling state interest
exists sufficient to justify regulation of protected speech by showing that the targeted speech places
children’s development at risk, that the speech causes the identified harm, and that restrictions on
speech will reduce the risk of harm to children. Parts V and VI turn to this analysis.
V. EMPOWERING PARENTS AS A GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
Although the courts have not demanded that the proponents of regulation articulate the compelling interests they seek to promote, the government has offered two plausible compelling interests

which merit serious consideration. First, the state asserts an interest in reinforcing parental authority, which is the focus of this Part. Second, the state posits an independent interest in shielding children from speech that could harm them, examined in Part VI.204
The government’s strongest argument in support of a compelling interest in regulating speech to
shield minors is the claim that the state acts to reinforce parental decisionmaking and to help parents
enforce their personal choices about what their children are ready to read, see, or hear.205 It comports with longstanding obiter dicta that parents and guardians are entrusted with the care and upbringing of children.206 When regulations on protected speech impinge on the zone of family privacy, two foundational rights collide, creating an even more urgent demand that the government
interest be clearly articulated and pursued with the greatest sensitivity. Government discrimination
among types of speech based on its assessment of whether the speech is suitable for minors, assumes a harmony of value preferences among parents within a pluralistic society. Because of the
range of views among parents, it may ultimately prove impossible for the government to regulate
speech with the goal of reinforcing the exercise of every parent’s autonomous authority.
A. The Principle of Family Autonomy
Personal autonomy is part of the essence of the First Amendment.207 Applied to families and
children considered as one unit, the general principle of autonomy is reinforced by the Supreme
Court’s longstanding obiter dicta that “it is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents.”208 In its 1923 decision in Meyer v. Nebraska, upholding the right of
parents to seek instruction in the German language for their children, the Supreme Court expressly
rejected communal models of child rearing where “no parent is to know his own child, nor any child
his parent,” as well as the model of ancient Sparta where the state trained children over age seven in
barracks in “order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens.”209 No matter how many
men of genius might support such modes of child rearing, the Court stated, “their ideas touching the
relation between individual and State were wholly different from those upon which our institutions
rest.”210 Any effort to impose such restrictions on parental choice would do “violence to both letter
and spirit of the Constitution.”211
The state’s claim of an interest in reinforcing family authority flounders in the face of the diversity of values among families in a pluralist society.212 The interests of the state and of individual
parents often conflict in the sensitive areas protected by the First Amendment. The notion that families may differ about the values they wish to transmit to their children has received longstanding
deference from the courts.213 Parents have a recognized liberty interest in raising their children as
they see fit, so long as they do not cross the line to jeopardize their children’s safety.214
For heuristic purposes we can divide families into three categories that reflect the complex relationships among government actors, mainstream mores, and each family’s values. First, in an “idealized normative family,” the parents share the moral values of the government actors as well as
sharing the same understanding of how to best transmit those values to the next generation, and the
children are on the low end of the spectrum of enterprise and disobedience. Second, the “imperfect
normative family,” the parents are assumed to share the general moral preferences of the government actors, but fail, through lack of information, fatigue and over extension, or under performance
of the parental role to protect their children, and/or the children fall higher on the bell curve for
traits of enterprise and disobedience in seeking out controversial speech. Third, countless varieties
of the “nonconformist” family exist, in which the parents do not share the view of the dominant culture and lawmakers regarding the definition of controversial speech. Such families differ from both

kinds of normative families in how they wish to handle children’s exposure to controversial speech
and in how they view the impact of such speech on their children. The children of nonconformist
parents may either share family norms or push parental limits through enterprise and disobedience,
even when those limits are relatively porous.215 Nonconformist families themselves will fall on both
extremes of a bell curve of attitudes toward various issues involving controversial speech.
For the regulatory interest in reinforcing parental authority to survive scrutiny, the regulations
would need to accommodate parental preferences in all three types of families, including the nonconformist family. In Turner, the Supreme Court underscored that”our political system and cultural
life rest upon the ideal” of individual choice regarding ideas and expression.216 “Government action
that stifles speech on account of its message,” the Supreme Court explained, “contravenes this essential right. Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public
debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”217
Parents in all three types of families presumably do not want the government to substitute its
judgment for theirs.218 Nonetheless, the nonconformist family in particular consists of exactly the
sort of individuals that the Supreme Court had in mind when it observed that, as a society, we cannot achieve “intellectual individualism” and “rich cultural diversities” unless we tolerate the risk of
“occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes.”219 The Court stated that “freedom to differ is not
limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.”220
In sum, two sets of constitutional values are at stake. The whole notion of “controversial”
speech “requires discrimination on the basis of conformity with mainstream mores,”221 an undertaking that is incompatible with the premises of the First Amendment. Despite the popularity of the fig
leaf provided by the state’s asserted compelling interest in children, whether under the guise of reinforcing parental preferences or not, it remains necessary to “carefully scrutinize[]” the justifications
the state offers for content-based distinctions on controversial speech.222 In addition, parental value
choices, including those about what speech their children should be able to hear, have been recognized as having constitutional dimensions.223
B. Empowering ParentsDemystified
The state relies heavily on the image of protecting children within the family unit by empowering parents to enforce the rules they impose on their children.224 The Supreme Court has deferred to
the “importance of the parental role in child rearing.”225 The Constitution also demands “that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity . . . to the special needs of parents and children.”226 If,
in fact, regulations on speech would empower the idealized normative family, the imperfect normative family, and the nonconformist family, then a compelling state interest might exist.227
But this is not the case. Scrutiny of the various arguments put forth in support of the notion that
state regulations on speech actually empower any family reveals that regulations on speech adopted
to protect children in fact threaten to undermine parental authority instead of reinforcing it.228
1. Parental Discretion
When the state makes controversial material entirely unavailable, it preempts crucial parental
discretion about what children can see or do.229 The presumption of family autonomy suggests that
such choices should normally be based on the family’s preferences, which might well take into ac-

count the individual minor’s level of maturity and responsibility.230 As adult citizens, the parents
have a First Amendment right to receive speech that is controversial but not obscene. The right to
receive information is a corollary of the right to speak.231 All adults have the right to engage in controversial speech, whether as speakers or as recipients of speech they wish to hear. In addition, parents have a constitutionally protected interest in their ability to digest and pass on information to
their children, regardless of community norms.232 That right is protected for parents in three ways:
(i) through the right to receive information under the Speech Clause; (ii) as a speaker communicating information and ideas; and (iii) by the right of family privacy.
In the area of sexuality, for example, the Supreme Court has recognized that parents may need
concrete information about sex, birth control, and sexually transmitted diseases to help them communicate with their adolescent offspring.233 The fundamental rights of parents protect a parent’s decision to provide a teenager with information about sex and related topics, even if the rest of the
community were to condemn such openness as violating the community’s norms of appropriateness.234 The Ginsberg decision, sustaining regulation of the sale of girlie magazines that were unprotected speech for minors, rested in part on the understanding that parents who “may wish their
children to have uninhibited access” to such literature could still legally purchase the material for
their children.235 Purchasing a magazine at a newsstand or convenience store is much less burdensome than circumventing bans and safe harbors by using “subscription and pay-per-view cable
channels, delayed-access viewing using VCR equipment, and the rental or purchase of . . . audio
and video cassettes.”236 Where the government places obstacles in the way of those who wish to obtain controversial speech, but does not ban the speech, it inhibits both individual adult recipients and
adults acting in their parental role who might wish to allow their children to receive such speech or
to use that speech to communicate with their children.237 If the material remains available but hard
to obtain,238 government regulations would burden a parent’s ability to share controversial speech
with an adolescent child.239
Although courts may assume that the “vast majority” of parents agree with the choices made by
government regulators,240 and that those parents welcome intervention, many parents might wish to
allow their children access to controversial material. Not every parent will agree about what material is controversial, much less what material may be harmful to the young. Adults within the same
family may not always agree about such matters.241 Each set of parents may differ depending on
which child is asking to see the controversial material. Issues such as the minor’s age, maturity, and
judgment will all enter into parental decisions.242
Some parents may decide to “view or listen to material with their children, either to criticize,
endorse, or remain neutral about what they see or hear.”243 For example, a parent may watch a racially insensitive or derogatory movie with an older child in order to help the child learn “to think
critically about offensive ideas.”244 Such a parent might believe that the shared experience and discussion would help the child to respond more effectively to racially disparaging speech heard outside the home, in keeping with the family’s non-racist values.245 The same might hold true of discussions of violence, sex, and other controversial topics. Parents who choose such an approach may
be dismissed by legislators and courts as having poor judgment,246 or condemned as those “who
wish to expose their children to the most graphic depictions of sexual acts.”247
The Speech Clause protects the decisions that each person makes about whether to obtain and
what to make of such controversial speech. First Amendment doctrine is clear: individual choice
about ideas is the keystone of “our political system and cultural life.”248 It is inconceivable that

when a person selects speech in a parental capacity he or she sacrifices the right to choose among
ideas. The “heart of the First Amendment” protects the freedom of each person, including each parent, to “decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and
adherence”249 or condemnation. To be sure, it is not always easy to live up to these ideals.250 But it
is important to do so, even if the vast majority of parents were to demand that they wanted controversial speech blocked.251
The heterogeneity among nonconformist families further undermines the notion that the state
can reinforce the choices of all parents by regulating speech. The category of nonconformist families includes families that strive to shelter their children from virtually all modern, secular speech.252
Those families pose special regulatory dilemmas.253 They frequently feel that their essential values
are endangered by exposure to subjective belief systems which propose that there may not be one
objective source of truth, and by other secularizing influences.254 Such families often attempt to
enlist the state as an ally, seeking accommodation in public schools to limit their children’s exposure to such topics as sex education and evolution, as well as to many types of literature.255
Such particularist families expand the boundaries of robust debate. But the state cannot fully accommodate the preferences of the subgroup of nonconformist parents who want to eliminate speech
for the children of their fellow citizens as well as for their own children. The litigation record makes
clear that such parents have frequently asked the state to engage in radical censorship in order to
help enforce their own views.256 Once again, the notion that regulation of speech reinforces parental
authority confronts disparities, not just among three types of families ranging from the idealized
normative to the nonconformist, but among nonconformist families themselves. Some want their
children to hear everything, others virtually nothing. These disparities make it nearly impossible for
the government to establish criteria that will not favor one family to the detriment of others.
Protecting listeners by banning controversial speech altogether is incompatible with the First
Amendment.257 The Supreme Court has consistently held that “the fact that society may find speech
offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.”258 To the contrary, protection of unpopular
speech is the essence of the First Amendment.259 As the Supreme Court forcefully reminded readers
in Texas v. Johnson, “if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.”260
Banning speech with the goal of reinforcing parental preferences is the height of irony. Bans
deprive parents of the opportunity to make their own decisions. As Chief Judge Edwards of the District of Columbia Circuit has forcefully written, such a regulation “does nothing to facilitate parents’
supervision of their children, unless we assume that all parents’ views are not only identical to each
other, but also the same as the Government’s. This assumption is preposterous . . . .”261
The assumption in its least benign form is worse than “preposterous.” Once the state regulates
communications in order to protect children from the “harm” such communications would allegedly
inflict, it is but a short step to label parents who disagree with majoritarian views and the government’s content choices as inadequate in their role as parents. The potential scope of child neglect
laws is broad, and the interpretation is open to subjective judgments. Child neglect statutes frequently have been used in an effort to legitimize government intervention in culturally nonconformist families.262

Although there does not seem to be any reported case in which exposure to speech, without
more, led to a neglect prosecution, the federal government has publicly contemplated this patently
absurd result under legislation designed to shield children from speech. At oral argument in ACLU
I, the Solicitor General conceded that, since the CDA lacked any exception for parents who allowed
their children to obtain “indecent” speech over the Internet--including information about birth control or AIDS--there could be “instances in which permitting access actually might constitute child
abuse.”263 As one of the Justices correctly noted in response, that would be “interfering with the relationship between parent and child.”264 Government labeling of “preferred” speech and “harmful”
speech for children is not only incompatible with the dictates of the First Amendment, it undermines the very families it claims to reinforce.
2. Aspersions on the Adequacy of Parental Supervision
Efforts to bar controversial speech or to make it hard to obtain in the name of helping parents
present yet another irony: they tacitly discount the capacity of parents in all types of families to
raise their children without the government’s intervention. Limitations on speech suggest that neither the idealized normative family nor the imperfect normative family is equal to the job of enforcing the values that they share with the regulators. Lower courts have said as much. In the context of
a safe harbor requirement for radio broadcasts, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reasoned that it did not suffice to limit controversial broadcasts to the hours when parents are at
work and therefore entirely unavailable to “supervise what their children see and hear.”265 Parents
apparently could not be counted on to have any idea what their children were up to, even when the
entire family was at home.266 As one of the sponsors of the statute at issue stated, “parental supervision is not a cure-all.”267 The court agreed, concluding without elaboration, “it is fanciful to believe
that the vast majority of parents who wish to shield their children from indecent material can effectively do so without meaningful restrictions on the airing of broadcast indecency.”268
If the government is correct that parents do not provide adequate supervision for children who
watch broadcast and cable television, listen to music and radio, cruise the Internet, and play video
games, it may be in part because the parents wittingly choose not to supervise, or do so in a way
that is too subtle for regulators to understand. In cases involving the channeling of controversial
speech to off-hours,269 such as ACT III, the government failed to adduce any evidence about
whether significant numbers of youngsters were exposed to controversial material or whether parents wished to limit what their children heard.270 The logic of supporting parental authority suggests
that, if the government has any legitimate interest at all in making controversial speech hard to obtain, that interest should be limited to the times when the average parent is at work and therefore
unable to supervise. But when “the great preponderance of children are subject to parental control,”271 whether or not they choose to exercise it, no governmental interest in regulating speech exists that is even legitimate, much less compelling.
The argument that the job of responsible parenting is impossible even for the best intentioned
parents at times masks a frontal attack on nonconformist parents, as Justice Brennan recognized
when he dissented in Pacifica:
As surprising as it may be to individual Members of this Court, some parents may actually find [the broadcast’s] unabashed attitude toward the seven ‘dirty words’ healthy,
and deem it desirable to expose their children to the manner in which Mr. Carlin defuses the taboo surrounding the words. Such parents might constitute a minority of the

American public, but the absence of great numbers willing to exercise the right to raise
their children in this fashion does not alter the right’s nature or its existence.272
Sixteen-year-old Filipina bi-sexual Rheana Parrenas and her parents recognized themselves as
targets of the CDA.273 Rheana contributes to a forum dedicated to people like herself on the Internet. She was concerned that the CDA would criminalize her self-expression, depriving her of an audience and others of the “fundamental idea of not being alone.”274 Her parents fully supported both
her expressive activities and her participation in the litigation challenging the CDA.275
The neighbors of nonconformist families and their children’s schoolmates will understand the
government’s message in the CDA and other statutes as well. Nonconformist parenting appears to
equal irresponsible parenting, even if it does not rise to the level of abuse that would justify the
state’s concrete intervention in the family. By means of moral legislation,276 the state intervenes at
the heart of the family without the due process that would be necessary in a formal investigation of
abuse.277
When the state divides speech into favored and disfavored categories on the premise that disfavored speech harms children, it acts on deeply embedded cultural norms. Law and regulation are
suffused with such cultural norms, frequently masquerading as either scientific findings or analytically derived legal certainties. The range of cultural norms is critical to the contemporary legal and
political debate about controversial speech and children, which one commentator has referred to as
the “problematization of children.”278
Regulations that impose moral norms on civil behavior implicating personal autonomy can have
pernicious effects on child rearing. Family autonomy means a right for parents to raise their children as they see fit.279 A mother might reasonably conclude that a daughter who would soon be
leaving for college should not be subjected to many rules at home, because she needs “the opportunity to learn to manage her time and make decisions before going away to college.”280 In other contexts, parents have testified that:
Just as part of teaching children about responsible behavior involves setting limits, part
of that teaching also involves showing them that rules are not rigid, and that reasonable
exceptions should be made when there is reasonable justification . . . . It usurps our role
as parents for the government to step in and tell us and our children that we cannot
make those decisions for ourselves . . . .281
This view of parenting as fostering the emerging autonomy of the young meshes with the legal
view of the maturation process. “Constitutional rights,” like children, the Supreme Court has held,
“do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.”282 As Justice Powell explained, the parenting role promotes responsible maturation by an “affirmative process” through which parents teach, guide and inspire in a way that is “beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions.”283 Such individualized decisionmaking teaches that
actions have consequences, and that responsibility is rewarded with freedom.284 These precepts help
the “children of this diverse and democratic nation . . . to develop habits of responsibility necessary
for self-governance and to observe not only the formal rules established by government but also the
informal rules and understandings that undergird civilized society.”285

Parental autonomy values are at issue when the state substitutes its own value preferences and
judgments for parental discretion regarding otherwise legal activities. In the arguably distinguishable context of a juvenile curfew,286 a plurality of the District of Columbia Circuit sitting en banc in
Hutchins v. District of Columbia suggested that parents’ rights to direct their children’s upbringing
were limited to life at home and educational activities.287 That plurality’s pinched version of parental autonomy would impinge upon daily decisions most parents make without thought of government intervention. Surely it:
would come as a stunning surprise to countless parents throughout our history who
have imposed restrictions on their children’s dating habits, driving, movie selections,
part-time jobs, and places to visit, and who have permitted, paid for, and supported
their children’s activities, in sports programs, summer camps, tutorial counseling, college education and scores of other such activities, all arising outside of the family residence and school classroom.288
The notion of government as decision-maker for children outside the home would trample minority views. The principle holds even if some parents--or nearly all parents--welcome the government’s legal reinforcement of the restrictions that they themselves would impose. The Hutchins plurality’s loose approach to the scope of state authority over children would violate Meyer by making
the child a virtual creature of the state.289
C. Parental Preferences and the Private Market
To the extent that regulating controversial speech facilitates parental decisionmaking, and cannot be accomplished without government action,290 a compelling interest may exist. Such a hypothetical situation would require balancing the state interest against the speech rights of adults and
minors as both speakers and recipients. But this possibility raises two additional questions. First, are
large numbers of parents eager for help in protecting their children from speech? Second, even if
they are clamoring for help, is state action the only way to provide that help?291
The measurable actions of parents themselves suggest that the answer to both questions is no.
Parents facilitate access to controversial speech by providing electronic equipment for their children: over ninety-six percent of American households have televisions,292 and more than two-thirds
of households subscribe to cable service,293 although parents are acutely aware that children watch a
lot of television.294 Even more telling, about eighty percent of all children have their own radios
(and among children under age twelve, two-thirds have their own radios), half of them with a headphone that prevents others from hearing what they are listening to.295 Approximately 110 million
Americans of all ages have access to the Internet whether at home, or through school or work; that
number grows daily.296 This data suggests that parents as an aggregate have concluded that the
benefits of receiving speech outweigh the risks for their own children.
Nor are parents rushing to embrace voluntary forms of monitoring compatible with their own
preferences, as represented by technologies such as Internet filters, cable lockboxes297 and television V-chips298 that erect barriers between their children and controversial speech. With the possible
exception of the somewhat rarified telephone dial-a-porn services,299 in most forms of communication, as Judge Wald expressed it, “parents would have to be hermits to be unaware through newspapers and even television itself of the debate over sex and violence.”300 After years of growth, improved technology and public debate, only about one-third of American parents with online connec-

tions in their homes use a commercially available filtering program.301 On the other hand, this is a
dramatic rise from only two years earlier, when the district court received evidence in ACLU I.302
The statistical trend suggests that as the market develops more refined filtering mechanisms that are
responsive to the genuine concerns of parents, families may be more inclined to use them. In contrast, a negligible number of cable subscribers have requested the free lockboxes that federal law
requires cable operators to provide.303
The potential legal and logistical problems with the voluntary use of filters are outside the scope
of this inquiry.304 But a brief consideration of filters, rating systems, and responses to sexually explicit e-mail in terms of the capacity of technology to enhance parental authority underscores that
constitutionally permissible measures exist to help parents in the private market. When filters and
ratings provide information that helps parents make decisions, such developments have the potential
to enhance parental authority.305 Parents need to understand, however, that existing filtering programs for Internet communications are both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.306 Such programs
almost uniformly block valuable controversial speech, such as all messages concerning homosexuality, as well as sites that include linguistic derivatives of the words “gay” or “sex.”307 One filtering
system used in some public schools blocks all information on the Gulf War, on the grounds that it is
too violent, while allowing unfettered access to information about sports teams, including
hockey.308 Nonetheless, to the extent that mechanisms can facilitate individual choice about which
speech is received without overbroad blocking of speech the recipients might wish to see, filtering
appears to be a potentially useful approach for parents.309
Filters may best enhance parental authority when a variety of ratings systems are available for
each medium of expression, reflecting a range of tolerance for speech and a diversity of world
views. Although the sheer volume of speech on the Internet, and even on cable television, makes it
difficult for raters who are not the producers of the material to keep pace, the system that might
serve parental autonomy would involve ratings by groups such as religious denominations, and
secular or political groups that have an articulated view about cultural norms and values. Parents
consulting such ratings on movies, or programming computer filters in order to impose restrictions
based on these ratings, would have a context for understanding the basis on which ratings were assigned. Parents could also test different rating systems to find the ones that most closely approximate the decisions they would make themselves. Those issues, however, concern the “means” side
of the speech equation, rather than the government interest or “ends” side, which is the focus here.
Finally, many parents worry about the risks they perceive to be associated with unsolicited emails from strangers containing controversial sexual material. Yet it is unclear that even this invasive practice creates a compelling independent government interest, because it can be handled
through another form of filtering that gives parents a great deal of choice. Unwelcome e-mail messages can be cut off by technology that empowers individual parents. For example, the system offered by America Online allows parents to block all e-mail with illustrations or attachments, to post
a list of senders whose mail should be delivered, with all other mail to be returned to sender, or to
instruct the Internet provider not to deliver mail from certain senders. Under First Amendment doctrine, listeners may affirmatively decline to receive certain materials.310 Consistent with that tradition, parents who choose to do so can give their Internet provider a list of approved correspondents
for their children (or themselves), and ask that mail from persons not on the list be returned to
sender. Unwanted e-mail can also be deleted unread under parental supervision, just as unwanted
postal service mail goes in the trash basket.

Filters installed in the home and administered by parents do not raise the same First Amendment
problems as those installed in public libraries, where the state becomes the censor.311 Significant
constitutional questions arise where the government installs filters or mandates the use of filters.312
To the extent that filters and rating systems impose or are tied to potential state sanctions that limit
what speech the young can receive, they risk becoming “a solemn ratification in constitutional terms
of the ‘generation gap.’“313
Government activities that neither regulate speech nor infronge on other protected liberties do
not require a compelling interest. A range of government programs designed merely to provide information without categorizing or disfavoring any particular speech may enhance parental authority
and pass constitutional muster.314 These programs include pamphlets containing advice on technology that could help enforce the family’s rules, regulations requiring service providers to inform parents about available blocking technology, and even warnings about unproven risks in herent in various forms of media. The government has a rational interest in establishing a commission to examine
existing research on whether controversial speech harms children.315 A rational basis is all that is
necessary to justify government recommendations and reference materials designed to help all parents make informed decisions about the rules they wish to impose on their own children, as long as
the state does not inhibit speech itself.
The economic market has demonstrated an ability to provide alternatives when a sufficient
number of parents care strongly about protecting their children from controversial speech. Filters
for television, monitored Internet sites,316 and tame computer games are achievable through the
market if there is adequate consumer demand.317 Similarly, labels designed to inform parents but
which are not attached to a screening mechanism, such as ratings of movies and musical recordings,
do not require state action.318
For example, since the rap group 2 Live Crew recorded a companion “clean” version of its
sexually explicit album “As Nasty as They Wanna Be,” entitled “As Clean as They Wanna Be,”319
retailers have made the release of expurgated rock music almost routine. Wal-Mart Stores, the nation’s largest retailer, among others, refuses to stock audio or visual material that their managers
regard as too sexually explicit or violent.320 Some record producers regularly provide a second version of both the lyrics and the album cover to large retailers like Wal-Mart visibly labeled “clean,”
or “sanitized for your protection.”321 As in other forms of First Amendment chill, some producers
and artists tone down the original release so that major marketers will carry it.322 While such developments affect the range of speech available, they do not constitute state action so long as the impetus really comes from stores and consumers.323
On the other hand, in many rural areas a major chain might be the only retail outlet for music
within a reasonable distance. Private choices may have an impact on the entertainment industry, because consumer purchases at large chains affect the sales charts.324 A chain store’s marketing decisions may make controversial speech harder to obtain, but for purposes of constitutional analysis the
distributor’s choice is not necessarily more significant than its choice of what color shirts to stock in
any given fashion season. These private actions constrict the marketplace of ideas, even as they enhance the authority of conservative parents. But they do not implicate or require government action,
thus further undermining the notion that state action is necessary to reinforce parental efforts to
shield children from controversial speech.
Producers and distributors cater to the demand for non-controversial entertainment by providing
special fora. These include PAX, a cable network which offers only family-oriented programs,325

Christian radio and television stations, and the burgeoning industry of Christian rock.326 Pacifica
Radio network and Playboy Enterprises--among other frequent parties to First Amendment litigation--respond to demand from a different group of listeners. When the market responds to particularized tastes by enhancing the possibility of matching speakers to those who want to hear their
message, it expands the marketplace of ideas for everyone. The marketplace could thus be responsive to all levels of parental levels of tolerance.
An expanded marketplace that reflects consumer preferences of all three types of parents, including both the most restrictive and the most permissive nonconformist, facilitates parental decisionmaking. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained, parental choice is an inherent
part of the systems to which we adhere as a society. “The decision a parent must make,” about
whether to install a filter on a computer is comparable to the decision about whether to block a
phone line, to “keep sexually explicit books on the shelf or subscribe to adult magazines. No constitutional principle is implicated. The responsibility for making such choices is where our society has
traditionally placed it--on the shoulders of the parent.”327
VI. THE STATE’S INDEPENDENT INTEREST IN SHIELDING CHILDREN
REGARDLESS OF FAMILY PREFERENCES
Proponents of regulation rely as well on a second potential interest, an independent state interest
in shielding children. Under Turner, in order to show that such a government interest is compelling,
the state must demonstrate the specific harm that flows from the speech it seeks to regulate. It must
also show that the regulation is likely to diminish the risk of the identified harm. But in case after
case, the proponents of government regulation have failed to articulate any specific harm to children
that would establish such an independent compelling interest.
A. The Government as Inculcator of Values for Citizenship
The primary argument that government has an independent interest in regulating controversial
speech that might reach minors builds on Prince v. Massachusetts, in which the Supreme Court upheld the use of child labor and compulsory school laws to bar a child from proselytizing on the
street with her family in the evening.328 The government’s interest in assuring the well-being of the
next generation of citizens is unquestioned when the actions taken to promote healthy development
do not impinge upon fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech or religion. Under Prince, government has a unique role to play in a democracy by ensuring “the healthy, well-rounded growth of
young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies.”329 In attempting to regulate speech
that children might receive in their homes, proponents of regulation appear to claim that the language “all that implies,” lacks any boundaries. The risk arises that the state would present itself as a
“superparent.”330
Those who favor state action designed to protect children from controversial speech base their
arguments on children’s vulnerability and presumed lack of capacity to make critical choices or protect themselves. Anglo-American jurisprudence has frequently accepted, without question, the notion that the average child experiences legal “disabilities” compared with the average adult.331 Even
legal commentators who are committed to an expansive reading of the Speech Clause have accepted
vulnerability as a justification for the state to restrict children’s speech rights.332 Concurring in
Ginsberg, Justice Stewart emphasized that “children lack the full capacity for individual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.”333 Without a presumption of capacity,

Justice Stewart argued, children are not free to participate in the “free trade in ideas” envisioned by
Justice Holmes or to decide for themselves “what [they] will read and to what [they] will listen.”334
Judicial acceptance of paternalism, the dominant doctrine supporting the notion that children
need state regulation to shield them from speech, proceeds from an undifferentiated notion of children’s vulnerability.335 In applying paternalistic presumptions, courts have failed to distinguish between rules made by the state and rules imposed by parents on their own children;336 between an
eight-year-old and a person who will turn seventeen in the next month;337 and between choices
made by the state about what children should read and hear in school and in the rest the universe
they occupy outside of school hours.338
A decade after Ginsberg, the Supreme Court clarified the characteristics of the age of minority,
which it saw as threefold: (i) “the peculiar vulnerability of children”; (ii) “their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner”; and (iii) legal recognition of the importance of
the “parental role in childrearing.”339 In the context of constitutional liberties, the Court underscored
the legal significance of distinguishing between “mature” and “immature” minors, although it provided no guidelines to the lower courts on how to make that distinction.340
The distinction remains important despite the lack of concrete guidance. In ACLU I, for example, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion chastised the government for its failure to acknowledge the
range of maturity represented during minority. “The strength of the government’s interest in protecting minors is not equally strong” for three-year-olds and seventeen-year-olds.341 For the fourteen
years in between, the level of maturity required may well depend on what kind of decision the child
is asking to make, and on the characteristics of the individual child. Parents are best equipped to
make such subjective distinctions based on their knowledge about each child’s level of maturity.342
The state, in contrast, can only make rules of general applicability.
The government’s role in safeguarding children and promoting their development into responsible citizens generally falls into three categories: (i) regulation of juvenile behavior that could not be
constrained for adults;343 (ii) protection from abuse and neglect;344 and (iii) education and inculcation for citizenship.345
The regulation of juvenile behavior generally has no bearing on restrictions on pure speech and
requires no further discussion here. While conduct may, under certain circumstances, constitute protected speech,346 receipt of protected communications does not currently constitute conduct amenable to punishment by the state.347 It is not unimaginable that in a regime which labeled selected
speech as dangerous for the young, receipt of such speech could join the array of status offenses,
i.e., acts such as truancy that are illegal only when committed by minors, and which are punishable
by confinement. Parents cannot protect their children from state involvement by consenting to behavior that constitutes a status offense.348
On the other hand, some parents turn to the juvenile justice system to help them discipline “incorrigible” young people. This pattern suggests that, if courts find a compelling interest in isolating
children from controversial speech sufficient to turn receipt of speech into an act of delinquency,
parents whose children break the family rules about television, movies, and music could turn the
state into the enforcer of family discipline. Such an outcome, while extreme, builds logically from
the arguments offered in support of regulation. If controversial speech threatens to turn children into
criminals, a proposition which is open to question, as discussed below, why not treat adolescents
who obtain such speech in the same way that courts treat teenagers who carry guns or sell drugs?

The second category--protection from abuse and neglect at the hands of parents and guardians-might support a compelling governmental interest in regulating controversial speech if the government could establish that such speech leads to serious physical, emotional, or psychological damage
which, in turn, could be attributed to negligent parents.349 In Ginsberg, the Court correctly relied on
Prince for the proposition that the state may intervene against parental wishes to “protect the welfare of children” and to safeguard them from abuse.350 This approach seems to suggest that where
the “imperfect normative family” or the “nonconformist family” fails to provide adequate supervision, the state could claim an independent role as guardian of last resort.351 Although one can imagine a case where parents exposed a child to speech that crossed such a clear line that it constituted
child abuse, such as reading sado-masochistic material that qualifies as obscene under Miller to a
four-year-old, it seems unlikely that such speech-related behavior would be the only questionable
acts committed by such parents. Because facts like these do not appear to occur frequently, and
courts are unlikely to find such cases difficult to decide if they do arise, this issue does not require
prolonged discussion.
The third and most widespread area of state intervention is the state’s role in education. Public
schools, the Supreme Court has held, are vital “in the preparation of individuals for participation as
citizens.”352 Schools are the vehicles for “inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.”353 Under existing doctrine, the government has great leeway in assessing and regulating the content of speech when it functions as educator.
Its role as educator and “inculcator of values” requires the state to make choices based on content and, at least sometimes, on viewpoint.354 It must, for example, create a curriculum consisting of
required and perhaps elective materials, and select texts that cover the curricular areas.355 The curriculum cannot accommodate every idea afloat in the marketplace of ideas, or even every possible
topic. In the unique setting of schools, such choices normally are not held to violate constitutional
norms because where the government is speaker, it must make choices by drawing selectively from
the marketplace of ideas.356 Courts give school officials great leeway in making such choices.357
Even though parents have some degree of choice about what kind of school their children attend-public or private, religious or secular, licensed or home-based--state governments set minimum
standards and curricular requirements that educational institutions must meet in order to satisfy
compulsory education laws.358 When children attend public schools, the discretion that courts accord to local officials is vast.359
Although it is possible to argue that the principles of free inquiry should prevail in schools outside of core curricular choices,360 courts have held that schools have “a significant measure of authority” over many student activities.361 A plurality of the Supreme Court has indicated that officials
may even remove books from the school library based on their subjective judgment of “educational
suitability.”362
Boards of education are not exempt, however, from the demands of the Bill of Rights. The discretion accorded public schools is bound by the underlying goal of promoting democracy and pluralism. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Barnette, the fact that schools are “educating the
young for citizenship is [particular] reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of
the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”363
The vast discretion accorded the state during school hours gives it a large bite at the apple.364
The ability to inculcate values during the school day--in the curriculum, in the library, and in extra-

curricular activities365 -- undermines the state’s position that its discretion to limit speech available
to minors should extend outside of school and even into the home. When the proponents of regulating speech to shield children seek to expand the state’s discretion outside the educational context,
they must overcome constitutional presumptions about both free expression and the zone of privacy
that protects parental decisionmaking.
Even if courts were to conclude that the state could justify expanding its inculcative function
beyond the schools, the precedents within schools themselves alert us to the risks that government
decisionmaking will threaten the autonomy of some portion of families. All over the country, school
choices about material have provided a continuing source of controversy and litigation. School officials have proven vulnerable to political mobilization by small groups of activist parents. Parents
with varying strongly-held beliefs relentlessly challenge the inclusion of books in the curriculum, in
optional assignments, and in the library.366 They have challenged the exclusion of similar materials.367 Communities are divided over sex education requirements and the content of such programs,
as well as over whether schools should provide access to condoms to protect the health and life of
students.368 In some school districts, parents with strongly-held religious views have objected to the
use of movies, secular music, and even computers in the classroom.369
Such controversies reiterate the divisions among family types, whether based on religion or
other core values and beliefs. These differences render categorization of communications directed at
children very difficult, even where the state has the greatest flexibility in making choices. Further,
school systems have not demonstrated a reliable or uniform ability to withstand pressure from parents or other groups with a clear social or religious agenda.370 Cultural battles in local schools suggest that national efforts to label or to regulate communications in an effort to shield children will
be rife with disagreements based on differing world views, creating genuine cause for concern that
government regulation of controversial speech will incorporate viewpoint as well as content discrimination.371
B. Identifying Harm
As Turner made clear, for the government to meet its burden to demonstrate a compelling interest in regulating speech, it must do more than allege that a harm exists. The state must present evidence that the harm is real, not merely conjectural, and show a nexus between the speech and the
harm indicating that the regulation will alleviate the harm “in a direct and material way.”372 Proponents of regulation have not yet identified the required specific harm and nexus in their efforts to
defend any of the regulations on speech that purportedly places children at risk.
Although decided under a mere rational basis test, Ginsberg contains the Supreme Court’s most
detailed analysis of the government’s independent interest in shielding children from speech.373 Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of five, agreed that the risks of pornography reaching children
required an insurance policy against parental inadequacy:
While the supervision of children’s reading may best be left to their parents, the knowledge that parental control or guidance cannot always be provided and society’s transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children justify reasonable regulation of
the sale of material to them. It is, therefore, altogether fitting and proper for a state to
include in a statute designed to regulate the sale of pornography to children special
standards, broader than those [regulating sales to adults].374

But pornography is not protected speech, and was never alleged to be at stake in the controversial
speech regulated by the legislation overturned in ACLU I, Denver Area, or Sable.
In order to establish the harm necessary to support a judicial finding of a compelling interest,
proponents of regulating speech first must show that the speech they wish to abridge actually
reaches children in significant numbers, and then must demonstrate the harm to the children whom
the speech reaches. Both of these inquiries bear directly on whether the harm is real or merely conjectural.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly chastised the proponents of regulation for failing to demonstrate that the targeted speech even reaches children with any frequency--let alone harms them. In
ACLU I, the Supreme Court relied on the government’s concession below that children would rarely
if ever stumble upon controversial material on the Internet by accident and, if they did, they would
be warned to leave the site before viewing it.375 The few examples of controversial or obscene sites
discovered by inadvertence turned out to be sites accessed because the government’s expert already
knew that the key words he was using would pull up material barred under the CDA, rather than
sites that real children had found.376 The paucity of evidence offered may be explained in part by
the informal reports that adult patrons almost never use Internet access in libraries to find “mildly
pornographic” or explicit sites, and librarians informally monitor children who seek pornographic
sites.377 Regulations on cable television suffer from the same constitutional infirmity. In Denver
Area, the Supreme Court criticized the government for presenting only “anecdotal references to
what seem isolated instances of potentially indecent programming,”378 “borderline examples as to
which people may differ.”379 The government failed to show that controversial speech existed on
PEGs, much less that it harmed children.
Lower courts have made similar findings. In regulating controversial speech on public radio, for
example, the FCC ignored the fact that teenagers comprised only 0.2% of the audience for public
radio, and further insisted that it had no obligation totake data on listening habits into account.380 An
undercover officer in New York State who logged over 600 hours on the Internet failed to identify a
single case that could not have been prosecuted under existing statutes criminalizing child pornography.381
In addition to showing that controversial speech actually reaches children regularly through the
targeted means of communication, those who wish to abridge speech to protect children must isolate
the specific harm such speech causes to children who receive it. But this requirement has also received short shrift. When Congress passed the CDA, for example, it expressly rejected language
that would have limited the Act’s reach to materials deemed “harmful to minors.”382 The legislative
history, sparse as it is, specifically indicates a Congressional intent to reach beyond the “harmful to
minors” standard upheld for unprotected speech in Ginsberg.383 As Judge Dalzell observed in his
separate opinion in ACLU I, the interest in protecting children “is as dangerous as it is compelling,”
because it has no limiting principle.384
Even where legislators try to stay within the rubric of the “harmful to minors” standard, the supporters of regulation have failed to show that exposure to controversial (as opposed to obscene or
violent) speech in fact harms minors, as it is required to do under Turner.385 For example, Chief
Judge Edwards of the District of Columbia Circuit, after several hearings on the regulation of indecent cable broadcast that was ultimately overturned by the Supreme Court in Denver Area, concluded that the “government has not offered one shred of evidence that indecent programming
harms children.”386

The design and results of empirical studies about the effects of speech make it important to distinguish speech about sexuality from speech about violence. Although it is nearly impossible to find
an iota of evidence that controversial speech about sex harms children,387 speech concerned with
sexuality is the content most commonly subject to regulation on their behalf, in contrast to speech
with violent content.388 For example, during one debate, five of the eight articles cited on the Senate
floor in support of regulating indecent speech expressly examined the impact of material about violence or suicide rather than the indecency targeted by the legislation.389 The FCC, in turn, relied on
the same evidence about violent speech in defending its abridgement of sexually explicit speech that
it did not dispute was protected under the First Amendment.390
In contrast to the dearth of support for the notion that sexually explicit speech is harmful, substantial social science research conducted over several decades lends support to the allegation that
violent speech may lead some children to violent attitudes or actions.391 Even this research, however, is not uncontroverted.392 One unresolved issue is that mere correlations do not equal a nexus,
or indicate that abridging speech will reduce harm.393 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
was persuaded by expert testimony that “TV violence studies do not provide strong evidence that
TV violence causes criminal behavior or aggression.”394 Another problem is that the results of social science research focused primarily on television and movies395 are frequently attributed to other
forms of speech. The Second Circuit criticized the defense of a regulation on trading cards depicting
violence based on inconclusive evidence about the very different medium of television, “a far more
powerful medium.”396
Although social scientists point to correlations between violence in the media and violent behavior, they have not found evidence that exposure to depictions of violence causes or even contributes
to antisocial behavior.397 Social scientist James Q. Wilson, a political conservative, recently concluded that there is “virtually no evidence” that violence on television and in the movies “affects the
serious crime rate,” which has been falling even as entertainment has become “more gruesome.”398
Other commentators, starting from the perspective that there is more evidence to justify regulation
of media violence than other forms of controversial speech, have concluded that existing social science data do not provide “a basis upon which one may determine with adequate certainty which
violent programs cause harmful behavior.”399
Similar evidentiary weaknesses help to explain the fact that no court has ever found civil liability for violence based on the influence of controversial speech.400 Courts have refused to find causation in tort actions even where the violent acts were committed contemporaneously with exposure to
the speech.401 This line of cases suggests that the link between speech that depicts violence and violent actions is not sufficient to satisfy the standard of causation under tort law. Presumably, the
nexus would have to be even stronger to satisfy the government’s burden of proof in establishing a
compelling interest in suppressing protected speech.
For all of these reasons, the second compelling interest offered for regulating speech, the government’s independent interest, fares no better than its first interest of reinforcing parental authority.
In the future, if proponents of regulating speech to protect children succeeded in meeting their burden of proof on each element needed to show a compelling interest, the issue still would not be resolved. Then, and only then, would a court actually confront a close question about whether the
regulation would survive constitutional scrutiny, requiring it to balance the weight of competing
constitutional interests. At that point, the courts would have before them a question of balancing at
the margin, that would permit comparing “the incremental promotion of the interest on which the

government relies with the incremental threat to freedom of expression.”402 That balancing would
include consideration of the mode and sweep of the regulation and other values such as parental
autonomy.
VII. THE CRITIQUE OF THE GOVERNMENT’S INTEREST APPLIED TO GERMANE
LOWER COURT OPINIONS
Notwithstanding the pervasive dicta to the effect that the government has a compelling interest
in shielding children from controversial speech, only a handful of lower courts have squarely considered and ruled on the proposition.403 Those courts are divided as to whether the government’s
interest met the standard of “compelling,” sufficient to justify narrowly tailored limitations on
speech. A brief review of these decisions, in light of the previous discussion of the government interests generally asserted, clarifies how analyzing the compelling interest can improve the quality of
judicial reasoning with respect to controversial speech and children.
A. Decisions Rejecting the Government’s Asserted Interest in Protecting Minors from Speech
In Video Software Dealers Association v. Webster and Eclipse Enterprises v. Gulotta, the Courts
of Appeals for the Eighth and Second Circuits overturned statutes designed to protect children from
violent material on videocassettes, and in trading cards depicting crimes.404 Both courts agreed on
several baseline points. Depictions of violence, they held, fall within the umbrella of the Speech
Clause, so efforts to regulate violent speech are subject to strict scrutiny, requiring that the regulation serve a compelling government interest.405 In each case, the state relied on its general power to
protect children,406 but both courts demanded that the government demonstrate a more precise compelling interest tied to a direct harm to children, and held that the government had failed to do so.
In Video Software, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the state’s failure to articulate whether it was concerned with “all kinds of violence” or only with “slasher” movies was
fatal to its efforts to restrict access to films.407 The court rejected out-of-hand the state’s assertion
that its “power to protect children” allowed it to suppress speech “that is neither obscene as to
youths not subject to some other legitimate proscription . . . solely to protect the young from ideas
or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.”408 The court made clear that the state
must identify the precise nature of the harm it is trying to prevent in order for the court to assess
whether or not the statute is narrowly drawn.409
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit went a step further in Eclipse, holding that the
government had failed to “demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and
that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms.”410 The government had failed to offer anything more than surmise and conclusory statements to show that crime trading cards either harm
minors or cause juvenile delinquency.411 The court expressly held that the statute barring dissemination of crime trading cards was not “necessary” to protect young people.412
In AIDS Action Committee of Massachusetts v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority the
District Court for the District of Massachusetts sent a message to proponents of regulation: where
the government fails to demonstrate a compelling interest, it should expect the court to overturn the
regulation without discussing narrow tailoring.413 Judge Zobel rejected the agency’s argument that
the possibility of harm to children could outweigh the rights of speakers to post safe sex ads promoting condom use.414 Moreover, the court found that the constitutional “interests of minors in receiving information trump the government’s interest in insulating them from that same informa-

tion.”415 AIDS Action provides a model of how courts should cut their inquiry short once the government fails to demonstrate a compelling interest.416
B. Lower Court Cases Finding a Compelling Interest in Protecting Children from Controversial
Speech
The three cases in which lower courts expressly sustained the compelling interest offered by the
government do not resolve the broader question of the nature of the state’s interest in regulating
controversial speech that may reach children, because each decision is tied to the factual context of
the case in accordance with the principle that Speech Clause analysis must be conducted on a caseby-case basis.417 Taken together, these three cases suggest that where a court concludes that the
government has met its burden to establish a concrete and clearly articulated compelling interest,
then the court is able to consider with greater precision whether the regulation is narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest.
In Bering v. SHARE, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, sitting en banc, expressly
found that the state had a compelling interest in regulating speech to protect children through an injunction limiting speech by anti-abortion picketers. The lower court had enjoined picketers’ oral use
of the words “murder,” “kill,” and “their derivatives” during their demonstration and barred them
from marching in front of the single entrance to the Medical Building which housed a number of
doctors’ offices, including the office where abortions were performed.418 The court focused initially
on the question of “whether the State has a compelling interest in protecting . . . children by limiting
the oral expression of the proscribed words at the picket site.”419 After a hearing, the lower court
had found that the anti-abortion picketers interfered with parents who were bringing their children
to see a pediatric allergist in the Medical Building. Specifically, the picketers referred to the doctors
collectively as “killers or murderers in the presence of young children.”420 Experts testified that this
verbal assault disturbed the children and undermined their trust in their doctors.421
In light of these facts, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington found that the state had established a compelling interest in preventing such speech in the presence of children.422 First, the
court emphasized that the injunction served the rights of parents by helping them to protect their
children from verbal assault and allowing them to “explain the concept of abortion to their children
personally, and only when they believe the children are able to understand it.”423 Second, the court
found that the government’s “independent interest in the well-being of its youth”424 was compelling
where the trial court expressly found that the specific language, when directed at young children,
was abusive and interfered with the ability of doctors to treat young children effectively.425 The
court concluded that the state had established “a compelling interest in avoiding subjection of children to the physical and psychological abuse inflicted by the picketers’ speech.”426
Even though the injunction was relatively narrow because it did not bar use of the same words
on placards and was designed solely to protect children who were too young to read, the state Supreme Court held that the articulated interest did not support the terms of the injunction, which the
court found would “water down speech to make it suitable for the sandbox.”427 The court remanded
the case for even more specific findings to pin down the precise scope of the government’s compelling interest. It instructed the lower court to determine the ages at which the speech would be most
harmful to children. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington further ordered that the injunction be narrowed to proscribe the offensive language only when children within that precisely defined age range are present, and also that the injunction be modified to provide guidance to picketers about how to assess the ages of children.428 Bering underscores the importance of both specific-

ity and a nuanced concern for context in speech cases.429 It suggests that courts are better equipped
to decide whether a regulation is narrowly tailored when they understand precisely what the regulation aims to accomplish. Where judicial analysis sustains the government’s compelling interest, the
rigor demanded by sound legal argument is more likely to lead to regulation that is carefully circumscribed to tread lightly on protected speech.
In ACT v. FCC (“ACT III”), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sitting en
banc held that the government has a compelling interest in “supporting parental supervision of what
children see and hear,” as well as a compelling governmental interest in the well-being of minors,
each of which was deemed sufficient to justify a ban on indecent radio broadcasts with a brief “safe
harbor.”430 The en banc opinion resolved a lengthy struggle among the three branches of government about regulation of indecent speech on the radio. The court remanded the matter to the FCC
with instructions to revise its regulations to provide a slightly longer safe harbor for the broadcast of
indecent speech on radio.431 The District of Columbia Circuit Court considered the FCC’s regulations on controversial speech within the confines of the much-criticized Pacifica decision. The context of radio broadcasts gave the FCC a foot up in arguing that the Supreme Court had already
found the interests compelling. Once the court deferred to that position, the only remaining question
appeared to be whether the regulation was narrowly crafted--which the court held it was not. ACT
III illustrates the importance of analyzing the interests asserted by the government, because in the
context of those articulated interests, the court was able to conclude that the means did not appropriately serve the proclaimed ends.
Finally, in Playboy Entertainment Group v. United States (“Playboy II”), a case pending before
the Supreme Court,432 the United States District Court for the District of Delaware found a compelling interest in shielding children from “signal bleed,” which occurs when portions of the video or
audio from a subscription cable channel appear to non-subscribers despite the cable operator’s efforts to limit the signals to subscribers. Congress addressed the problem of signal bleed in Section
505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which is the subject of a facial challenge in Playboy
II.433 Section 505 requires cable television operators to “scramble” subscription (premium) channels
specializing in sexually explicit adult programming in order to “protect children from signal bleed,”
or to limit their broadcasts of explicit material to “safe harbor” hours in the middle of the night.434
Scrambling eliminates the possibility that non-subscribers could accidentally receive visual or audio
signals which they do not seek.
A series of opinions by Judge Roth of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit expressly considered “whether [the statute] survives strict scrutiny by addressing a compelling interest.”435 The
court took Denver Area as its starting point, noting that content-based strict scrutiny applies to regulations on cable television, and that Denver Area had expressly defined the interest asserted before
the Court as “the protection of children from exposure to patently offensive depictions of sex”--the
“same problems” that led to enactment of Section 505. It then distinguished the statute overturned
in Denver Area from Section 505 on two grounds. First, Judge Roth explained that the target of Section 505 was not the protected speech itself, but rather “signal bleed, a secondary effect of the
transmission of that speech.”436 Second, Judge Roth distinguished the speech at issue in Section 505
from most other efforts to regulate speech because the signal bleed intrudes into the homes of persons who have chosen not to subscribe and thus expect not to receive explicit programming.437 The
court declined to grant a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed the panel’s decision
in Playboy I by memorandum opinion.438

Plaintiff Playboy ultimately obtained an injunction enjoining enforcement of Section 505 following a trial at which Judge Roth presided.439 In granting the injunction, the court once more expressly considered the nature of the interest offered by proponents of Section 505. Because it had
admonished the parties during the preliminary hearing not to return without briefing the nature and
scope of the government’s interest and providing “additional evidence demonstrating the effects of
sexually explicit materials on children,”440 the court criticized the “paucity” of the government’s
evidence. In particular, Judge Roth regarded two important questions as unanswered by the government’s presentation: “does viewing signal bleed of sexually explicit programming constitute a
harm to children?,” and does signal bleed even constitute a pervasive problem?441 Subsequently, at
oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Justices noted more than once that the record failed to
answer either of these questions.442 Instead, at the evidentiary hearing, the government relied on
studies of the effect of televised violence on children, which the lower court deemed inapposite to
regulations on sexually explicit speech, and offered no evidence at all on the effects of “intermittent
signal bleed” as opposed to “explicit pornography.”443 Even though it acknowledged that the “mere
articulation of a theoretical harm is not enough” to establish a compelling government interest under
normal circumstances, the court concluded that the standard of proof was lower where protection of
children was at issue.444
Applying its own new flexible standard that “only some minimal amount of evidence is required
when sexually explicit programming and children are involved,” the court reluctantly held that the
government had established a sufficient risk of harm to constitute a compelling interest.445 Nonetheless, the court enjoined enforcement of Section 505 because the statute was not narrowly tailored to
use the least restrictive means of regulating the controversial speech: a cable lockbox which would
allow parents to block signal bleed from entering their homes, combined with a requirement that
cable providers notify all subscribers that blocking devices are available without charge.
The district court in Playboy II correctly demanded that the government present evidence supporting its claim to a compelling interest, but the court failed to follow its analysis to the requisite
conclusion. Even though the government failed to show that signal bleed actually reaches children
with any regularity, or that intermittent signal bleed harms children when it reaches them, the court
found that the cumulative merits of the government’s purported interests sufficed under a relaxed
standard, which it erroneously assumed should apply because children were involved. In this respect, the Playboy II court fell short of the more rigorous analysis performed by the courts in both
AIDS Action, which found that the government failed to show a compelling interest,446 and Bering
v. SHARE, which held that a very narrowly defined compelling interest existed, justifying an even
narrower regulation on speech.447
C. Pending Appellate Litigation: Playboy II and ACLU II
Two important cases which would allow appellate courts to examine the nature of the government’s purported interest in regulating controversial speech to protect children are currently undergoing review: Playboy II and ACLU II. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the government’s appeal of the decision below in Playboy II on November 30, 1999; the case is pending as
this Article goes to press.448 Playboy II offers an excellent opportunity for the Supreme Court to
clarify that it is not sufficient for the government to invoke the needs of children in order to establish a compelling interest that will justify regulations on speech that is protected for adults.449
The Supreme Court might well use Playboy II to emphasize that the government faces the same
burden of establishing a compelling interest where the speech of all members of the community is

regulated with the express aim of protecting children as in any other case. The need for such analysis may be even more pressing when the government’s purported purpose is to protect children because the cultural temptations to take that interest at face value are so strong. Even if the Supreme
Court declines to raise the issue sua sponte in Playboy II and decides the case entirely on other
grounds, the case illustrates how imperative it is not only to scrutinize the government’s purported
interest in shielding children from controversial speech, but to also insist that the government meet
its constitutional burden to establish that interest.
An appeal is also pending before the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in ACLU II. Revisiting the problem of children and controversial speech on the Internet after the Supreme Court’s 1997
decision in ACLU I, Congress enacted the Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (“COPA”),
which was to go into effect in November of 1998. COPA makes it a criminal offense for a person
engaged in the business of communicating on the World Wide Web to knowingly post communications “harmful to minors.”450 A federal district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of COPA
before it took effect.451 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard oral argument in the matter
on November 4, 1999, and the court has not yet issued its decision.
The district court in ACLU II did not examine the government’s asserted interest, except to note
that “the government clearly has an interest in the protection of minors, including shielding them
from materials that are not obscene by adult standards.”452 Congressional findings make clear that
COPA relies primarily on the government’s alleged independent interest in deciding what speech
minors should be able to receive. Congress expressly stated that “innovative ways to help parents . .
. restrict material that is harmful to minors through parental control protections and self-regulation .
. . have not provided a national solution to the problem of minors accessing harmful material on the
World Wide Web.”453 Parents, the government repeatedly asserts, cannot be trusted to protect their
children in ways that meet congressional approval.454
At the time it passed the CDA, overturned in ACLU I, Congress did not examine which speech,
if any, actually harms the young and expressly rejected the modifying phrase “harmful to minors”
as too narrow.455 In COPA, Congress again made no effort to determine what sort of controversial
computer speech, if any, in fact harms minors.456 Instead, COPA defines the material “harmful to
minors” as including all communications that meet a statutory variable obscenity standard based on
the Miller test, refined for minors on the assumption that such material is harmful rather than merely
distasteful when it reaches minors.457 The approach closely mirrors the state statute upheld by the
Supreme Court in Ginsberg.458 But Ginsberg indicates that material does not meet the definition of
variable obscenity under the statute unless the communications “taken as a whole, lack[] serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.”459 COPA’s own language, however, belies
a facial effort to limit its scope to material that fits the Ginsberg model. Despite its initial reliance
on a definition of material “harmful to minors” that mirrors the test for obscenity, COPA bars commercial Internet communications that “include[] any material” harmful to minors. The phrase “any
material” suggests that analysis of the value of the speech would not be confined to the communication “taken as a whole.”460 Moreover, COPA is both over- and under-inclusive because it would
reach some arguably indecent sexual speech which has not been shown to lead to concrete harms,
but would fail to reach depictions of violence unless they also fall into the category of variable obscenity, even though the evidence is stronger that depictions of violence harm children more than
sexually explicit speech harms children.

In addition, the statute appears to reach a much broader array of sexually explicit speech than
the speech which meets a definition of variable obscenity for minors. In granting a preliminary injunction, the district court ruled that COPA could threaten valuable content including “resources on
obstetrics, gynecology and sexual health; visual art and poetry . . . information about [non-obscene]
books and photographic images offered for sale; and online magazines,” even news magazines.461
COPA provides an affirmative defense to speakers who restrict access to their web sites by requiring proof of age through means such as credit cards or identification numbers. The imposition
of adult identification requirements as a mode of regulating speech at first glance seems constitutionally palatable462 compared to bans or channeling, at least to the extent that it resembles proof of
age to purchase liquor or tobacco. But it is not legal for minors to purchase or consume alcohol or
tobacco and consumption of such products does not enjoy constitutional protection. Controversial
speech, in contrast, is constitutionally protected.
Equally important from a doctrinal vantage point, as the district court found in ACLU II, a risk
exists that adult identification will be transformed into a requirement that consenting adults affirmatively request controversial speech and identify themselves before entering Internet sites.463 While
adults may choose to identify themselves by using credit cards in bookstores, or by checking out
library books, they can preserve anonymity in acquiring many forms of speech by paying cash or
browsing. Forcing adults either to identify themselves to request speech or to forgo the speech altogether violates the holding of the Supreme Court in Lamont v. Postmaster General that imposing an
affirmative obligation on a person who wishes to receive unpopular speech violates the First
Amendment.464
Adult identification regimes that allow parents to obtain controversial material for minors or encompass the possibility of verifiable parental consent for those under the age of majority may be
conducive to accommodating the range of family types from the idealized normative to the nonconformist, depending on whether the nature of the medium makes such identification schemes feasible. Newsstands, bookstores, libraries, movie theaters, video rental stores and even dial-a-porn
businesses can establish effective adult identification at a reasonable cost. For Internet communications, however, the Supreme Court found in ACLU I that no reliable technology currently exists “to
determine the age of a user who is accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups
or chat rooms.”465 The government did not contest this finding in ACLU II.466 To the extent that age
verification is currently technologically feasible on the Internet, courts have found that verification
would be “prohibitively expensive” for many speakers with inherently valuable messages.467 Because it is not currently feasible to segregate material that is obscene for minors from material that
is protected and valuable for minors on websites (as opposed to magazine stands and video stores),
Ginsberg is inapposite to computer communications.468 Limitations designed to protect children
from Internet speech will chill speakers and inhibit the speech available to adults.469
It may not be sufficient, however, to distinguish Ginsberg in the Internet context, or to limit its
applicability based on its use of the rational basis standard. COPA confronts us with the underlying
flaws in the Ginsberg analysis. COPA, like Ginsberg and the entire concept of variable obscenity,
fails to draw comprehensible lines for speakers and those who distribute speech. By failing to define
the specific types of speech that harm children and to articulate the nexus between that speech and
the harm, regulators may unleash a regime of unbridled censorship.470 The statutory definition of
variable obscenity brings us no closer to understanding how to delineate the speech that is protected
from being labeled “obscene for minors” because it is valuable for children. COPA would likely

prevent children from receiving valuable speech to which their parents may wish them to have free
access by limiting the availability of speech with artistic, literary, and educational value.471 COPA’s
definition of variable obscenity makes no provision for differentiating speech that has social value
for three-year-olds from speech that has value for mature adolescents. But assessment of value will
vary depending on the individual youngster’s maturity and ability to use information thoughtfully,
which parents can interpret in each instance, but the government cannot.
The notion of variable obscenity leaves the question of what speech is harmful unresolved despite the congressional effort to create a definitional tautology that equates variable obscenity with
harm to minors. Variable obscenity, directed at speech which would be merely “indecent” for
adults, raises all of the issues of subjectivity which plague efforts to define indecent speech directed
at adults.472 Nor does the construct of variable obscenity answer the threshold question of whether
the state is entitled to make value judgments about speech on behalf of the young, or whether such
decisions are reserved for parents.
VIII. CONCLUSION
At times, the struggle over controversial speech appears to be a war between “two ancient enemies: Anything Goes and Enough Already,” as one federal judge observed in holding a rap recording obscene.473 When sensitive matters of freedom of speech collide with images of children’s
vulnerability, and are framed in terms of the battle between good and evil, even well intentioned
people can lose sight of fundamental constitutional principles. In the process, the requirement that
courts apply each element of strict scrutiny to regulations on speech has all but evaporated.
Faced with the justification of shielding children, courts have repeatedly failed to apply the
standard enunciated in Turner, which requires the government to demonstrate a compelling interest
in regulating protected speech. In all of the major cases decided by the Supreme Court, the state has
failed to meet its burden with respect to the three elements of a compelling interest: the state has
failed to articulate the precise harm it seeks to address; the state has failed to establish a nexus between the regulated speech and the specific harm; and the state has failed to do more than speculate
that the restriction of speech will alleviate the articulated harm.
Neither of the interests most commonly alleged by the government to support regulations of
controversial speech stands up to strict scrutiny. As Part V makes clear, the government’s professed
interest in reinforcing parental authority often clashes with principles of family autonomy and cultural pluralism that are central to the Constitution. The state’s evaluation of speech undercuts the
authority of parents who do not share normative cultural values. In order to empower parents in a
constitutionally permissible manner, government regulation on speech would have to support
equally the choices made by the idealized normative family, the imperfect normative family and by
all manifestations of the nonconformist family. Instead, by replacing parental judgment with its
own, the state threatens a new level of intrusion into the family.
The second compelling interest offered by the government--an independent interest in protecting
children regardless of their parents’ preferences--also threatens state interference in the family. The
government’s claim of an independent interest often reflects concerns about social anxieties and
personal morality rather than any demonstrable harm precisely linked to the speech. The realm of
cultural morality is best left to informal gatekeepers of social norms and may not be appropriate for
legal remedies within the framework of the Constitution.474

Moreover, even if either of the two interests that the government offers as compelling were to
withstand scrutiny, they appear to be mutually exclusive. The state cannot simultaneously claim to
reinforce the authority of all parents and proclaim its own independent interest in sheltering children
from speech that their parents allow them to receive. Under the Speech Clause, only parental authority and discipline stand between minors and protected speech absent clear evidence that the
speech causes a specific harm.
The flaws in the government’s reasoning suggest that regulations of speech to protect children
will more often than not fail to meet the stringent requirements of the Speech Clause. In most instances, the burden on the government to establish a compelling interest will probably prove insurmountable when formulated in broad terms.475 Regulations on controversial speech imposed under
the guise of protecting children face additional constitutional hurdles even if the government were
to satisfy all three elements of the Turner test. After satisfying the requirements of Turner, the government would still have to convince a court that the regulation should survive balancing of competing interests at the margin and met requirements such as narrow tailoring.
It is not necessarily impossible for the state to satisfy the strictures of Turner in regulating carefully defined controversial speech tied to a specific harm to children. In some circumstances, the
state may be able to establish a compelling interest in protecting children that comports with the requirements of both the Speech Clause and the doctrine of family autonomy. To do so, legislatures
and administrative agencies would need to demonstrate that the speech actually harms children, that
the private market or other means are unable to provide remedies for parents who seek them, and
that the regulation would actually facilitate the choices made by parents, including all of the diverse
views of nonconformist parents. Any effort to craft regulations that satisfy those conditions will call
for a great deal more precision than has generally been exercised in this sensitive area. As analysis
of narrow bans on anti-abortion demonstrators in Bering v. SHARE made clear, the more precisely
the state defines the purported harm, and the narrower the state’s purported interests, the more likely
it becomes that the state will be able to demonstrate a harm that can be ameliorated by a narrowly
crafted regulation.
Serious attention to the doctrinal framework developed in this Article would help all three
branches of government to keep the mandates of the Speech Clause clearly before them when dealing with the emotionally charged issues raised by children and controversial speech. To articulate
the state’s compelling interest in a manner that will withstand constitutional scrutiny, legislators,
regulators, and judges must use a fine brush rather than a paint roller when they try to shield children. To the extent that government actors fail to demonstrate the requisite sensitivity when regulating speech to protect children, plaintiffs who seek to overturn restrictions on speech may wish toreconsider the traditional reluctance to challenge the government’s alleged interest.
The state has frequently disregarded a range of constitutional principles in the quest to safeguard
children.476 Widespread tolerance for intrusions on the rights of minors, and of adults in the name of
protecting minors, is predicated on the misconception that the resulting compromises are small and
that the rights at stake are relatively insignificant. That complacency is unwarranted. The compromises to free speech and family autonomy are great, and the rights affected lie at the heart of constitutional liberties. The Supreme Court warned against such encroachment over one hundred years
ago: “It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate
and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.”477
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The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
2

Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see id. at 95-102 (explaining that government
may impose content neutral "time, place and manner" restrictions on speech but may not single out
one subject or viewpoint for regulation); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
641 (1994) (reiterating that government cannot stifle speech on account of its content, "subject only
to narrow and well-understood exceptions"); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-383
(1992) (confining unprotected speech to limited categories such as fighting words, direct incitement
of lawless action, and obscenity); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414-20 (1989) (holding that flagburning is protected speech). Cases recognize exceptions to protected speech, for example, statements about private citizens are given less protection than statements about public officials in libel
cases, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-46 (1974), incitement to "imminent lawless action" is not protected, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), and "fighting
words" are not protected, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
3

See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128-30 (1989) (rejecting the government
claim that a total ban is necessary to protect minors). The term was first used in Enforcement of
Prohibitions Against the Use of Common Carriers for the Transmission of Obscene Materials, 50
Fed. Reg. 42,699, 42,706 n.54 (1985), rev'd, Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846
(2d Cir. 1986).
4

See Sable, 492 U.S. at 130-31.

5

Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (overturning a state statute barring production and
circulation of any book "tending to the corruption of the morals of youth"); see also Reno v. ACLU
("ACLU I"), 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997).
6

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983) (overturning ban on mailing unsolicited material regarding contraceptives), quoted with approval in ACLU I, 521 U.S. at 875).
7

Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Del. 1998), prob. juris. noted, 119 S. Ct. 2365 (1999) ("Playboy II"); see Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
States, 945 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1996), aff'd mem., 520 U.S. 1141 (1997) ("Playboy I").
8

Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231 (West Supp. 1999).

9

ACLU v. Reno ("ACLU II"), 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (preliminarily enjoining enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act), appeal docketed, No. 99-1324 (3d Cir. Apr. 1999).
The preliminary injunction in ACLU v. Reno "likely will be appealed all the way to the Supreme
Court." Christopher Wolf, Courts, Not Congress, Should Set Limits on Internet Content, LEGAL
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at 25.
10

Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (overturning a total ban on commercial
telephone sex messages known as "dial-a-porn").
11

Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (overturning key
sections of a federal statute which required cable television operators to prevent transmission of indecent programming over leased access channels, and permitting cable operators to prevent transmission of such materials on public, educational, and government access channels (known as
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elimination of televised violence would serve--let alone accomplish--a compelling state interest in
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Records 1995) (1996 Grammy Award Winner for Best Rock Song of the Year).
89

NINE INCH NAILS, Closer, on THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL (Interscope Records 1994). Numerous other, more graphic examples exist. Marilyn Manson, who appears in a black leather thong
and calls himself a satanist, has been barred from performing in a number of localities and draws
protesters in others. See Neil Strauss, A Bogey Band to Scare Parents With, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
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Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 n.10 (1975). Subsequent to Ginsberg, the Court
rejected the Roth-Memoirs test for obscenity, and substituted the Miller test; the Court has "not had
occasion to decide what effect Miller will have on the Ginsberg formulation." Erznoznik, 422 U.S.
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the ordinance to movies that are obscene as to minors." Erznoznick, 422 U.S. at 213 n.10, 216 n.15.
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signed it. By 1973, Justice Brennan, who had authored the Court's first express holding on the constitutional status of obscenity in Roth, had concluded that there was no way to craft a constitutionally sustainable definition of obscenity, as he indicated in his dissent from Paris Adult Theater I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting), and its companion case, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 47 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, who voted with the majority
in Ginsberg, and Justice Stewart, who concurred in Ginsberg, both joined Justice Brennan's dissents
in Miller and Paris Adult Theatre. Presumably, if there is no way to define obscenity for adults, the
drafting problems do not disappear just because the standard is a "variable" one for minors. See
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 673 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (finding a rational basis for distinctions among cable television facilities under the Equal Protection Clause).
118
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See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 769 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority
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120
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since then. See Edythe Wise, A Historical Perspective on the Protection of Children From Broadcast Indecency, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 15, 17, 33-34 (1996) (applauding the FCC's enforcement of the obscenity, indecency, and profanity prohibition in the least restrictive manner,
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Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT I"), 852 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that the
Supreme Court has never examined whether the FCC definition of indecency was unconstitutionally
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tions for financial grants); Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU I"), 521 U.S. 844, 867, 871 (1997) (criticizing the
uncertainty of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 for undermining Congress's objective of
protecting minors from potentially harmful materials).
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used in the Act). The Supreme Court's most recent opinion on indecent speech also failed to define
the nature of that speech, reserving interpretation of the congressional definition ("general standards
of decency") to a federal administrative agency. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 589 (holding that Congress
may instruct the National Endowment for the Arts to decline to fund art that may offend general
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ACLU I, 521 U.S. at 872 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
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See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 132 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Justice Stevens' plurality opinions in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978),
and Young v. American Mini-theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 65-66 (1976), suggested that patently offensive or indecent speech might have only "slight social value," but that proposition did not command a majority. See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 n.6 (1992) (rejecting Justice
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Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731-32 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.R.2d
94, 98 (1975)). Justice Stevens never addressed the question of whether the government had alleged
a compelling interest in protecting children, but rather appeared to take the government's interest at
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